On Point

State v. Corey D. Williams, 2003 WI App 116
For Williams: Michael J. Edmonds

Issue/Holding:

¶21. As a final matter, we address the effect of Williams’s plea withdrawal on further proceedings in the circuit court. It is well-settled that “repudiation of a portion of the plea agreement constitutes a repudiation of the entire plea agreement.” State v. Lange, 2003 WI App 2,

State v. Richard A. Lange, 2003 WI App 2
For Lange: Daniel F. Snyder

Issue/Holding: Partial relief against a plea bargain-based guilty plea “constitutes a repudiation of the entire plea agreement,” ¶32, a principle which is now extended to instances where there are multiple judgments of conviction not all of which are under appeal, under the rationale of State v. Briggs, 218 Wis. 2d 61,

State v. Corey D. Williams, 2003 WI App 116
For Williams: Michael J. Edmonds

Issue/Holding:

¶1.… We conclude that judicial participation in the bargaining process that precedes a defendant’s plea raises a conclusive presumption that the plea was involuntary. Therefore, we adopt a bright-line rule barring any form of judicial participation in plea negotiations before a plea agreement has been reached. Because it is undisputed that the trial judge participated in the negotiations that led up to Williams’s pleas,

State v. Leonard C. Matson, 2003 WI App 253
For Matson: Michael Yovovich, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where counsel had raised a pre-sentencing objection on ground of plea bargain breach to the use of a detective’s letter to the court asking for a sentence exceeding the bargained length, failure to raise further objection at sentencing did not constitute waiver:

¶32. Matson sufficiently preserved his objections to the letter for appeal.

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶58. First, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded, as it did, that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing context. Other-acts evidence is permissible to show the context of the crime and to provide a complete explanation of the case. 

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:  

¶59. The other-acts evidence was permissible to show the victims’ state of mind, to corroborate information provided to the police, and to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses in light of their recantations. Such purposes have been held to be permissible purposes in Wisconsin. 

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶60. Next, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive. When a defendant’s motive for an alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged crime, we have held that other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive. 

State v. Timothy M. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 258
For Ziebart: Robert R. Henak

Issue: Whether the holding of State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982) (re sexual assault where the defendant admits the act but claims consent: prior sexual misconduct has no probative value) imposes an absolute bar against admissibility of prior other-acts to prove the contested issue of consent.

State v. Rodney K. Stenseth, 2003 WI App 198, PFR filed 9/2/03
For Stenseth: Robert A. Ferg

Issue/Holding: The state did not violate the plea bargain, which limited its recommended disposition to two years’ confinement plus extended supervision, by expressing agreement with some portions of the PSI (which recommended 8 years’ confinement plus supervision):

¶12. Here, the State’s reference to the plea agreement was not less than neutral.

State v. Robert Jamont Wright, 2003 WI App 252
For Wright: Ann Auberry

Issue/Holding:

¶44. Alternatively, Wright argues that Lomack’s testimony was admissible as other acts evidence of a third-party perpetrator pursuant to Scheidell. Scheidell involved the admissibility of other acts evidence committed by an unknown third party, which was proffered by the accused on the issue of identity.