On Point

State v. Bruce A. Kassube, 2003 WI App 64
For Kassube: Leonard D. Kachinsky

Issue/Holding:

¶7. We conclude, however, that the totality of the circumstances supports a reasonable basis for James’s suspicion. James had known Kassube between nine and twelve years and had never known Kassube to have a driver’s license at any time during that period. Further, within eleven months of the stop, Kassube informed James that he still did not have a license.

State v. Guy W. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25
For Colstad: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding: Although some United States Supreme Court cases seemingly assume that probable cause is required to support a stop for civil infractions, state precedent allows such a stop on reasonable suspicion, ¶12. The stop in this case is upheld:

¶14 The undisputed testimony demonstrates that the collision occurred on a straight road with “absolutely clear”

State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting

Issue: Whether attempted sexual assault of a child (by intercourse), § 948.02(2), is a crime known to law, in that the offense lacks an intent element and any crime of intent, § 939.32, requires specific intent for the completed act.

Holding: Sexual contact explicitly requires “intentional touching,” and therefore supports a charge of attempted assault by contact, 

State v. Evan Zimmerman, 2003 WI App 196, (AG) PFR filed 9/10/03
For Zimmerman: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: Although “most of the persuasive evidence against” Zimmerman was his own statements and alibi; and although a conviction may not be based solely on a negative inference drawn from the defendant’s own version, other evidence sufficiently supported the conviction, including: “evidence of his obsessive behavior,

State v. Theodore J. Krawczyk, 2003 WI App 6, PFR filed 1/21/03
For Krawczyk: John T. Wasielewski

Issue/Holding:

¶25. Krawczyk next argues that he was incorrectly charged as “a party to the crime” of felony murder and that this error also rendered his plea to that offense unknowing. We agree with Krawczyk that the State did not need to include the party-to-a-crime allegation in the felony murder charge.

State v. Anthony M. Cotton, 2003 WI App 154
For Cotton: Timothy T. Kay

Issue/Holding:

¶19. Following the preliminary hearing and bindover, the State filed an information containing new charges pertaining to Cotton’s encounter with Paikowski-one count of battery or threat of battery to Paikowski and a further similar count regarding Paikowski’s family pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.201(2)(a) and (b). These charges require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant caused or threatened to cause bodily harm to the victim or victim’s family,

State v. Phillip Cole, 2003 WI 112, on certification
For Cole: Michael Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶20. We find that the state constitutional right to bear arms is fundamental. It is indeed a rare occurrence for the state constitution’s Declaration of Rights to be amended. See Monks, The End of Gun Control, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. at 249.

State v. Munir A. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, on bypass
For Hamdan: Chris J. Trebatoski

Issue/Holding:

¶46. Under its broad police power, Wisconsin may regulate firearms. It may regulate the time, place, and manner in which firearms are possessed and used. The concealed weapons statute is a restriction on the manner in which firearms are possessed and used. See State v.

State v. Munir A. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, on bypass
For Hamdan: Chris J. Trebatoski

Issue/Holding:

¶20. To convict a person of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23, the State must prove three elements. First, the State must show that a person who is not a peace officer went armed with a dangerous weapon. State v.

State v. Timothy T. Clark, 2003 WI App 121
For Clark: Rodney Cubbie

Issue/Holding: Police tow of an automobile for “safekeeping,” even though “none of the typical public safety concerns illustrated by Opperman are at issue,” but rather on the ground that the vehicle was unlocked and therefore potentially at risk of theft, was unreasonable because effective alternatives to police seizure were available:

¶21.