On Point

State v. Joseph Steffes, 2003 WI App 55, PFR filed 3/13/03
For Steffes: Daniel P. Ryan

Issue/Holding: Violation of administrative code provision does not support suppression. ¶¶9, 25.

But: this decision was based largely on State ex rel. Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999), a case that was essentially overruled by State v.

State v. Jose Carlos Navarro, 2003 WI App 50, PFR filed 3/5/03
For Navarro: Michael S. Holzman

Issue/Holding:

¶1. This case presents an issue of first impression in Wisconsin. Jose Carlos Navarro contends that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention bestows a judicially enforceable individual right upon foreign nationals who have been detained by police to consult with the consular officials of their country.

John Doe and Jane Doe v. Heck, 327 F. 3d 492 (7th Cir. 01-3648, 4/16/03)

Issue/Holding: “(T)o the extent § 48.981(3)(c)1 authorizes government officials to conduct an investigation of child abuse on private property without a warrant or probable cause, consent, or exigent circumstances, the statute is unconstitutional.”

Also see Michael C. v. Gresbach, 7th Cir No. 07-1756, 5/19/08: “Today we reiterate Heck’s definitive holding,

State v. Timothy T. Clark, 2003 WI App 121
For Clark: Rodney Cubbie

Issue/Holding: Existence of, and compliance with, a police policy on conducting an inventory search relates only to the reasonableness of the search and not the seizure of the item searched:

¶11. Here, the State contends that the search of the vehicle was a valid inventory search. “Although an inventory search is a ‘search’

State v. James W. Keith, 2003 WI App 47, PFR filed 3/5/03
For Keith: Christopher A. Mutschler

Issue/Holding: Evidence not suppressible merely because seized by officer effectuating stop outside of his or her jurisdiction: there is no “reason to ignore the well-established rule that suppression is required only when evidence is obtained in violation of a constitutional right or in violation of a statute providing suppression as a remedy,”

State v. Terrance J. O’Neill, 2003 WI App 73
For O’Neill: Roger D. Sturdevant, SPD, Monroe

Issue: Whether a judge’s persistent and partisan efforts to require litigation on a recurrent issue on which the court of appeals had already reversed him, in an unpublished case in which the judge actively appeared as a party on the appeal, establishes disqualifying bias.

Holding: Bias not established: The judge intends to require litigation on the disputed issue in every case,

State ex rel. William E. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, reversing 2002 WI App 133, 254 Wis. 2d 690, 648 N.W.2d 522
For Marberry: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶23. The extraordinary relief provided by the writ of habeas corpus is available only in limited circumstances and is subject to three prerequisites. Haas ,

Clyde Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2003)

Issue/Holding: Requirement of certificate of appealability doesn’t apply to habeas challenge to state disciplinary proceeding, citing Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2002).

Rule reaffirmed: Edward D. Anderson v. Benik, No. 05-2323, 12/20/06 But for another circuit’s rejection of this approach, creating a potentially cert-worthy split,

Terrance Bernard Davis v. Borgen, 349 F.3d 1027 ( 7th Cir. 03-2354, 11/20/03)

Issue/Holding: A certificate of appealability of dismissal of a habeas petition filed four years after the deadline is vacated:

To recap the statutory requirements: (1) A certificate of appealability may be issued only if the prisoner has at least one substantial constitutional question for appeal.

State v. John A. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222
For Jipson: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶16. Jipson’s answers, while incriminating, have no bearing on the focus here. That is, the answers do not establish Jipson knew the State had to prove the purpose of the sexual contact was an element of the crime. The critical inquiry is whether Jipson otherwise knew at the time of entering his plea all of the essential elements of the offense so that it can be said he knowingly pled guilty to the crime.