On Point

State Charles A. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, reversing, 2000 WI App 251, 239 Wis. 2d 423, 620 N.W.2d 398
For Dunlap: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: “(W)hether a defendant who is charged with sexual assault should be allowed to present evidence of sexual behavior exhibited by the child complainant prior to the alleged assault, even though the evidence would normally be barred by the rape shield law,

State v. Anthony J. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, affirming 2001 WI App 172, 247 Wis. 2d 195, 633 N.W.2d 207
For Leitner: Jefren Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the expunction statute, § 973.015, requires prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to expunge their records documenting the facts underlying an expunged conviction.

Holding:

¶38. Although the Wisconsin legislature has not explicitly set forth the purpose of Wis. 

State v. James O. Edwards, 2002 WI App 66, PFR filed 2/18/02
For Edwards: Glenn C. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether failure to object to exhibits (uncertified copy of judgment of conviction; DOC fax indicating prior periods of confinement) waived an argument that the state failed to prove Edwards’ repeater status.

Holding: Failure to object to documentation that facially establishes repeater status waives the issue of sufficiency of proof; 

State v. Thomas P. Sterzinger, 2002 WI App 171
For Sterzinger: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue1: Whether fleeing, § 346.04(3) requires proof that the defendant knowingly “interfere(d) with or endanger(ed)” another.

Holding1: Scienter is required, but is limited to a single element — knowingly flee or attempt to elude — and doesn’t extend to “interfere with or endanger.” ¶¶7-11.

Issue2: Whether fleeing,

Village of Little Chute v. Todd A. Walitalo, 2002 WI App 211, PFR filed 8/1/02
For Walitalo: Ralph A. Kalal

Issue/Holding:

¶11. However, the arresting officer, by reading the informing the accused form, simply stated the truth: If Walitalo refused to submit to a chemical test, his driving privileges would be revoked. This statement did not involve any deceit or trickery, but instead accurately informed Walitalo of his precise legal situation. 

State v. Donald Marshall, 2002 WI App 73, PFR filed 2/28/02
For Marshall: Richard L. Zaffiro

Issue: Whether, after the OWI arrestee refused consent for a blood draw, the police could then obtain “consent” for the draw by threatening to use physical force.

Holding: Marshall’s argument that § 343.305(9)(a), by providing the exclusive police option for refusal, bans such a threat has been rejected by State v.

State v. Michael J. Carlson, 2002 WI App 44, PFR filed 1/17/02
For Carlson: Christopher A. Mutschler

Issue: Whether Carlson was entitled to have his refusal charge dismissed with prejudice because his driver’s license was improperly revoked for nineteen days before he was granted a hearing.

Holding: Due process protections — with respect to a hearing before loss of particular interests — are afforded under Mathews v.

State v. Darin W. Baratka, 2002 WI App 288, PFR filed 10/20/02
For Baratka: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding:

¶12      Baratka claims that he was not properly informed of his choices and was therefore unable to understand his rights regarding chemical testing.  In order for Baratka to prove he was not adequately informed, he must show:

1.      Has the law enforcement officer not met,

State v. Roland Smart, 2002 WI App 240
For Smart: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether sentencing-guideline disparity for driving while intoxicated under guidelines adopted by local counties pursuant to § 346.65(2m) violates equal protection or due process.

Holding: Sentencing guideline disparities need be supported only by rational basis for equal protection purposes, as “(i)t is not a fundamental right to be free from deprivations of liberty as a result of arbitrary distinctions.”

State v. Prentiss M. McKinnie, 2002 WI App 82, PFR filed 3/14/02
For McKinnie: Bryan J. Borman, SPD, Waukesha Trial

Issue: Whether separate charges, of carjacking and operating the same motor vehicle without owner’s consent are permissible where, after allegedly taking the car, the defendant continued to drive it the next day.

Holding: Though these offenses are the same in law, under § 939.66(2r), the facts as alleged are distinct and therefore support separate charges in this particular instance:

¶11.