On Point

State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565

For Samuel: Robert A. Henak

Issue/Holding: Ҧ35. Under Velez, first the defendant must bring a motion to suppress, alleging facts sufficient to show that a statement was involuntary under Clappes and that the police misconduct at issue is egregious such that it produces statements that are unreliable as a matter of law.

State v. Stanley A. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, reversing 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565

For Samuel: Robert A. Henak

Issue/Holding: Ҧ30. With due process as our touchstone, we conclude that when a defendant seeks to suppress witness statements as the product of coercion, the police misconduct must be more than that set forth in Clappes.

State v. Zan Morgan, 2002 WI App 124
For Morgan: Timothy A. Provis

Issue: Whether Morgan was in custody, for Miranda purposes, after being handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car.

Holding: Custody is determined under “the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as: the defendant’s freedom to leave; the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the degree of restraint.”

State v. Howard C. Carter, 2002 WI App 55
For Howard: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Although review of a trial court’s determination of subjective (non-)bias of a prospective juror is generally deferential, here review is independent “because this is one of those rare situations where the prospective juror’s unambiguous response, rather than his demeanor, is the basis of his subjective bias.” ¶10. And, because the juror openly admitted his bias,

State ex rel. Gary Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, reversing 2001 WI App 131
For Tate: Jerome F. Buting, Pamela S. Moorshead, Buting & Williams

Issue/Holding: The Evans-Thompson rule — “the state may compel a probationer to answer self-incriminating questions from his probation or parole agent, or suffer the consequence of revocation for refusing to do so, only ‘if he is protected by a grant of immunity that renders the compelled testimony inadmissible against the [probationer] in a criminal prosecution’”

State v. Luther Williams, III, 2002 WI 58, on certification
For Williams: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: ¶8 n. 4:

The State moves to strike Williams’ appendix to his brief. It asserts that the inclusion of excerpts from the BNA Criminal Practice Guide and copies of articles pertaining to drug analysis and crime labs are outside the scope of what is permissible in an appendix.

State v. Dale H. Chu, 2002 WI App 98
For Chu: Andrew Shaw, Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶41. In his reply brief, Chu offers no response to the State’s argument concerning information about Wales. Unrefuted arguments are deemed admitted. See Charolais Breeding Ranches v. FPC Secs. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979). Accordingly, we reject his argument without further discussion

State v. Marvin C. Seay, State v. Christopher Tillman, 2002 WI App 37

Issue/Holding:

¶1. In these two appeals, the appellants filed unsigned notices of appeal with the clerks of the circuit courts. The issue is whether the failure to sign the notice of appeal deprives this court of appellate jurisdiction. In accord with the recent United States Supreme Court ruling in Becker v. Montgomery,

State ex rel. Willie C. Simpson v. Schwarz, 2002 WI App 7, PFR filed 1/11/02

Issue: Whether spent on electronic monitoring while on probation supports sentence credit following revocation.

Holding: Because the probationer could not have been charged with escape for leaving electronic monitoring, he isn’t entitled to sentence credit for the time he spent on electronic monitoring. ¶¶31-33.

State v. Paul L. Polak, 2002 WI App 120, PFR filed 5/3/02
For Polak: Philip J. Brehm
Issue/Holding:

¶15. When an adequate colloquy is not conducted, and the defendant makes a motion for a new trial or other postconviction relief from the trial court’s judgment, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing on whether the waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary….¶16.