On Point

State v. Darin W. Baratka, 2002 WI App 288, PFR filed 10/20/02
For Baratka: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding:

¶12      Baratka claims that he was not properly informed of his choices and was therefore unable to understand his rights regarding chemical testing.  In order for Baratka to prove he was not adequately informed, he must show:

1.      Has the law enforcement officer not met,

State v. Roland Smart, 2002 WI App 240
For Smart: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether sentencing-guideline disparity for driving while intoxicated under guidelines adopted by local counties pursuant to § 346.65(2m) violates equal protection or due process.

Holding: Sentencing guideline disparities need be supported only by rational basis for equal protection purposes, as “(i)t is not a fundamental right to be free from deprivations of liberty as a result of arbitrary distinctions.”

State v. Prentiss M. McKinnie, 2002 WI App 82, PFR filed 3/14/02
For McKinnie: Bryan J. Borman, SPD, Waukesha Trial

Issue: Whether separate charges, of carjacking and operating the same motor vehicle without owner’s consent are permissible where, after allegedly taking the car, the defendant continued to drive it the next day.

Holding: Though these offenses are the same in law, under § 939.66(2r), the facts as alleged are distinct and therefore support separate charges in this particular instance:

¶11.

State v. Razzie Watson, Sr., 2002 WI App 247
For Watson: Dennis Schertz

Issue/Holding: A guilty plea suffices to establish a qualifying repeater-enhancement, even though the judgment of conviction on that plea isn’t entered until after commission of the offense being enhanced. ¶¶9-14.

State v. Jimmie Davison, 2002 WI App 109, reversed on other grounds, 2003 WI 89
For Davison: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: A guilty plea doesn’t waive a facially valid multiplicity claim. ¶13.

The supreme court took review on this threshold issue: “First, does a criminal defendant who pleads guilty to several crimes in a negotiated plea agreement waive the right to raise a multiplicity claim against one of the resulting convictions?” ¶2.

State v. Razzie Watson, Sr., 2002 WI App 247
For Watson: Dennis Schertz

Issue/Holding:

¶5 An admission from a defendant stating, “I am a repeater,” without more, is insufficient to constitute an admission of a prior conviction under WIS. STAT. §973.12(1). As the circuit court indicated in its colloquy, “repeater” and “habitual offender” are legal, not factual terms, and a defendant may not be aware of what he or she is admitting. 

  
State v. Jimmie Davison, 2002 WI App 109, reversed on other grounds, 2003 WI 89
For Davison: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: Remedy for a multiplicity violation is left to trial court, applying test in State v. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, ¶57, 249 Wis. 2d 553, 638 N.W.2d 564.

State v. Robert S. Robinson, 2002 WI 9, on certification
For Robertson: Leonard D. Kachinsky

Issue/Holding:

¶2. The question of law raised on appeal is what is the appropriate remedy when an accused is convicted on the basis of a negotiated plea agreement and the counts later are determined to be multiplicitous, violating the accused’s state and federal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy?

State v. Joseph F. Volk, 2002 WI App 274
For Volk: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison App

Issue: Whether the extended supervision portion of truth-in-sentencing, § 973.01, supports repeater enhancement, § 939.62(1)(b).

Holding: Because specifies that “confinement” may be enhanced, applying the principle that specification works an exclusion of non-enumerated items, the extended supervision portion of a sentence is not subject to repeater enhancement.

State v. Ary L. Jones, 2002 WI App 208
For Jones: Arthur B. Nathan

Issue/Holding:

¶14. The rule we adopt in Wisconsin, therefore, is that when a defendant makes a fraudulent representation to the sentencing court and the court accepts and relies upon that representation in determining the length of the sentence, the defendant has no reasonable expectation of finality in the sentence. The court may later declare the sentence void and double jeopardy will not bar subsequent resentencing to place the defendant in the position he or she would have been in if the fraud or corruption had been exposed at the time of the original sentence.