On Point

State v. Stephen T., 2002 WI App 2
For Stephen T.: Raymond M. Dall’Osto

Issue: Whether appeal of a juvenile delinquency adjudication is rendered moot by expiration of its dispositional order.

Holding: No, at least in this instance: certain facets of the order (DNA sample; sex offender registration) survive, and appellate review will therefore have a practical effect. ¶11. (The court doesn’t say whether its mootness holding is limited to offenses that incur these particular consequences.) Moreover,

State v. Larry J. Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, PFR filed

For Sprosty: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to qualify a social worker as an expert in this Ch. 980 supervised release proceeding.

Holding: Because the witness had “expertise with respect to treating sex offenders … she was qualified to give her opinion on the ultimate issue.” ¶29.

State v. Larry J. Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, PFR filed

For Sprosty: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether an expert witness’s testimony should have been struck retrospectively when it became known, after the proceeding had concluded, that he had lied about his credentials and background, and had committed misconduct, causing him to be fired.

Holding: “¶33. We cannot conclude that the circuit court’s refusal to strike Thomalla’s testimony was improper.

State v. Garren G. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227

For Gribble: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in questioning prospective jurors outside the presence of defendant and counsel, on “hardship and infirmity requests” not to serve.

Holding: Questioning jurors about undue hardships “does not implicate the purposes of voir dire that are the premise for a defendant’s constitutional entitlement to be present with counsel” (namely,

State v. James G. Langenbach, 2001 WI App 222

For Langenbach: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the state may call a defendant to testify, as an adverse witness, at Phase II of an NGI trial, following Phase I guilty plea.

Holding: A guilty plea doesn’t necessarily result in loss of fifth amendment rights: The privilege continues at least until sentencing, ¶9; moreover, the privilege continues during the direct appeal,

State v. Ervin Burris, 2004 WI 91, affirming 2002 WI App 262, 258 Wis. 2d. 454, 654 N.W.2d 866For Burris: Joseph L. SommersIssue: Whether a condition of supervised release, that Burris “avoid all conduct … that is not in the best interest of the public’s welfare or your rehabilitation” provided adequate notice that obtaining a prescription for Viagra would subject him to revocation.

Holding:

¶53.

State ex rel Thomas Hass v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 128

Issue/Holding:

¶10. The issue presented in this case is whether this court should exercise its constitutional superintending and administrative authority to direct the court of appeals to accept all petitions for interlocutory appeal where the circuit court has denied a claim that the state court action is barred by a final federal court judgment on issue and claim preclusion grounds.

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Eugene Nichols v. Litscher, 2001 WI 119
For Nichols: Jeffrey O. Davis, Daniel J. LaFave

Issue: Whether a pro se prisoner’s petition for review may be accepted for filing in the supreme court, even though received after the filing deadline, where it was delivered to prison authorities for mailing before the deadline.

Holding:

¶11 We decline to interpret the term ‘file’

State v. Anou Lo, 2003 WI 107, affirming unpublished opinion of court of appeals
For Lo: Robert R. Henak
Amicus Briefs: Joseph N. Ehmann, Wm. J. Tyroler, SPD; Meredith J. Ross, Walter J. Dickey, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: Retroactivity on collateral attack of a  “new” rule– one imposing a new obligation on the state and not dictated by prior precedent – must satisfy the test of Teague v.

State v. Colleen E. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195, on certification
For Hansen: Pamela Pepper

Issue: Whether a prior decisional pronouncement should be treated as precedential when it is contradicted elsewhere in the decision.

Holding: “Because of the internal inconsistency [in the prior decision], no judicial precedent was established in the first place,” ¶33.