On Point

County of Dunn v. Goldie H., 2001 WI 102, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals
For Goldie H.: John E. Joyce

Issue: Whether a ch. 55 subject has a right to a hearing before the circuit court orders continuation of protective placement; and whether the circuit court must make findings of fact to support such an order.

Holding:

¶6. We hold that a person is entitled to a hearing on the record before his or her protective placement is continued,

State ex rel. James A. Mentek, Jr., v. Schwarz, 2000 WI App 96, 235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 N.W.2d 746, reversed on other grounds, State ex rel. James A. Mentek, Jr. v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 32

Issue: Whether appointed counsel’s failure to exhaust administrative appeals, which resulted in waiver of the right of judicial review of a revocation, can be challenged as ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. Michael S. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, affirming State v. Piddington, 2000 WI App 44, 233 Wis.2d 257, 607 N.W.2d 303
For Piddington: Michelle Ann Tjader

Issue: Whether BAC results were suppressible because the profoundly deaf defendant could not have heard the implied-consent law recitation of rights.

Holding:

¶1 … We hold that § 343.305(4) requires the arresting officer under the circumstances facing him or her at the time of the arrest,

State v. Lawrence P. Peters, 2001 WI 74, 244 Wis. 2d 470, 628 N.W.2d 797, reversing, 2000 WI App 154, 237 Wis. 2d 741, 615 N.W.2d 655
For Peters: Jane K. Smith

Issue: Whether Peters may, at his OAR-5th sentencing, collaterally attack his OAR-2d conviction, on the ground of denial of counsel.

Holding:

¶4 We view this case as falling within the right-to-counsel exception to the general rule against collateral attacks on prior convictions.

State v. Rayshun D. Eason, 2001 WI 98, reversing State v. Rayshun D. Eason, 2000 WI App 73, 234 Wis. 2d 396, 610 N.W.2d 208
For Eason: Suzanne Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether evidence obtained after entry of a home in violation of the announcement rule, because authorization was provided by an invalid no-knock warrant, is nonetheless admissible under the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement.

State v. Wilton Tye, 2001 WI 124
For Tye: Mark D. Richards, Christy M. Hall

Issue: Whether evidence seized under a search warrant, invalid on its face because unsupported by oath or affirmation, is covered by the good faith exception.

Holding:

¶24. Fourth and finally, the State asks this court to allow admission of the seized evidence under a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

State v. Wilton Tye, 2001 WI 124
For Tye: Mark D. Richards, Christy M. Hall

Issue: Whether evidence seized under a search warrant unsupported by oath or affirmation must be suppressed.

Holding: The requirement that a search warrant be supported by oath or affirmation is an explicit and long-standing feature of both state and federal constitutions, as well as legislation, and is essential to the warrant’s validity.

City of Milwaukee v. Sammie L. Glass, 2001 WI 61, affirming 2000 WI App 252, 239 Wis. 2d 373, 620 N.W.2d 213

Issue/Holding:

¶19 Considering the aims and objects of a Wis. Stat. § 968.20 action and the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 968.20, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 968.20 establishes an in rem proceeding. The court reached this same conclusion in a recent case.8

¶20 We now turn to whether the plaintiff may obtain monetary damages from the City in this proceeding under Wis.

State v. Carlos Perez, 2001 WI 79, reversing State v. Perez, 2000 WI App 115, 235 Wis. 2d 238, 612 N.W.2d 374
For Perez: R. Douglas Stansbury

Issue/Holding:

¶1 … The issue presented is whether a person who is convicted of carrying a concealed and dangerous weapon under Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1997-98) has ‘committed a crime involving the use of the dangerous weapon,’

State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54
For Kelsey C. R.: Susan Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Kelsey’s detention was prolonged beyond its proper purpose.

Holding: The operative principle is settled: “an investigative detention … must last only long enough to fulfill the purpose of the stop.” ¶44. Applying that principle — (3-vote lead opinion:) The purpose of the stop was to dispel the idea that she was up to criminal activity;