On Point

State v. Joseph K. Bryant, 2001 WI App 41, 241 Wis. 2d 554, 624 N.W.2d 865
For Bryant: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the “routine booking question” exception to Miranda permitted questions about biographical data.

Holding: Miranda warnings need not precede routine questions that merely gather background biographical data in the booking process. ¶14. “To qualify for the application of the exception,

State ex rel. Michael J. Gendrich v. Litscher, 2001 WI App 163

Issue: Whether an unpublished decision may be cited for its “persuasive” value.

Holding: ¶7 n. 6:

We acknowledge that the cited order from the Seventh Circuit is an ‘unpublished opinion.’ However, the Seventh Circuit’s rule only prohibits citation of an ‘unpublished opinion’ as precedent in any federal court in that circuit. 7th Cir.

State v. Eric D. Gillespie, 2001 WI App 35, PFR filed 2/1/05
For Gillespie: John Anthony Ward

Issue: Whether, following bindover by court commissioner under § 757.69(1)(b), a defendant may obtain a “preliminary hearing de novo” (i.e., a second preliminary hearing) in circuit court under § 757.69(8).

Holding:

¶7 The State contends that WIS. STAT.

State v. Matthew J. Trecroci, Ryan J. Frayer, Ronnie J. Frayer, Scott E. Oberst, Amy L. Wicks, 2001 WI App 126, PFR filed 5/31/01
For defendants: Robert R. Henak

Issue: Whether a motion to reconsider injected sufficiently new issues into the case so as to require a separate notice of appeal to make the order denying that motion reviewable.

Holding:

¶22 In summary, when the basis for a reconsideration motion is a recent decision,

State v. Cherise A. Raflick, 2001 WI 129
For Raflik: Michael J. Fitzgerald, Dean A. Strang

Issue/Holding:

¶1. This case requires us to decide whether suppression is the proper remedy when a telephonic application for a search warrant is not recorded in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(d)1, and when the factual basis for the warrant is reconstructed in an ex parte hearing after the warrant has been executed.

State v. Larry J. Sprosty, 2001 WI App 231, PFR filed
For Sprosty: Jack E. Schairer, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court erroneously exercised discretion in granting the state’s motion to vacate an SVP order for supervised release entered, but not implemented, almost four years earlier.

Holding: Under § 806.07(1)(h), there is no deadline for relieving a party from a judgment or order, so long as “extraordinary circumstances”

State v. John Casteel, 2001 WI App 188, PFR filed

Issue: Whether the appeal is sufficiently frivolous to warrant sanctions.

Holding:

¶19. On five previous occasions, Casteel’s appeals have been dismissed based on Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo. This case is dismissed on the same basis. Because we conclude that Casteel knows or should know that this, his eighth postconviction order appeal, is without any reasonable basis in law or equity and is not supported by a good faith argument for an extension,

State v. Paul L. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 66, 242 Wis. 2d 426, 625 N.W.2d 655
For Wolfe: Gary Seeling

Issue: “The basic question before us is whether a court, in a multiple count conviction where one sentence is imposed and another stayed, must apply sentence credit to the conviction of the first imposed sentence,” ¶1.

Holding:

¶1. … We hold that it must under the rule of State v.

State v. Gabriel L. Ortiz, 2001 WI App 215
For Ortiz: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Failure to object to restitution until postconviction motion would not incur waiver bar for several reasons: particular claim is of statewide interest; the state never argued waiver in the trial court; the issue is one purely of law. ¶¶11-13.

State v. James A. Torpen, 2001 WI App 273, PFR filed 11/13/01
For Torpen: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a court has authority to order, as restitutive conditions of probation, payment of obligations from prior, unrelated criminal cases.

Holding:

¶14. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20, a circuit court may order the payment of restitution to victims of crimes for which the defendant is being sentenced,