On Point

State v. Hayes Johnson, 2000 WI 12, 232 Wis. 2d 679, 605 N.W.2d 846, reversing State v. Johnson, 223 Wis. 2d 85, 588 N.W.2d 330
For Johnson: Russell D. Bohach

Issue1: Whether a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises from an increase in the charge following grant of mistrial due to hung jury.

Holding: No presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness applies to an increase in charges following mistrial due to hung jury.

State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2000 WI App 121, 237 Wis.2d 418, 614 N.W.2d 530
For Koeppen: Richard L. Zaffiro

Issue: Whether the repeater-qualifying convictions were inadequately proved merely because they weren’t made part of the appellate record.

Holding: “Even if the trial court did not include these documents in the appellate record, the documents’ existence at the time of sentencing is not negated because,

State v. Guy R. Willett, 2000 WI App 212, 238 Wis.2d 621, 618 N.W.2d 881
For Willett: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court had authority to change its sentences from concurrent to consecutive to a separately imposed sentence, four months later, after concluding that its sentencing was based on an erroneous understanding of the law.

Holding: Although the trial court clearly wanted its sentences to run consecutive to a separately imposed sentence,

State v. Frank James Burt, 2000 WI App 126, 237 Wis. 2d 610, 614 N.W.2d 42
For Burt: Michael P. Jakus

Issue: Whether the trial court violated double jeopardy by amending sentence the same day of imposition, before judgment of conviction had been entered, after realizing it had mistakenly said “concurrent” instead of “consecutive.”

Holding: “The double jeopardy clauses did not attach a degree of finality to Burt’s original sentence that prevented the trial court from correcting its error later in the same day,”

State v. David M. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, on certification; clarified on reconsideration, on a different point, 2001 WI 6
For Hahn: Steven G. Bauer

Issue: “(W)hether the persistent repeater penalty enhancer as applied to the defendant violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.” ¶5.

Holding: Imposing a life sentence without possibility of parole,

State v. Calvin E. Gibson, 2000 WI App 207, 238 Wis.2d 547, 618 N.W.2d 248
For Gibson: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶1. The question presented is whether the habitual criminality enhancer may be applied to a conviction for a second offense felony of firearm possession. Calvin E. Gibson, who was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, second offense,

State v. John W. Page, 2000 WI App 267, 240 Wis.2d 276, 622 N.W.2d 285
For Page: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether possession of dangerous weapon enhancer, § 939.63, requires actual use or threat to use the weapon while committing the enhanced offense.

Holding:

Under the correct reading of [State v.] Peete [,185 Wis.

State v. David M. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, clarified on reconsideration, 2001 WI 6, on certification
For Hahn: Steven G. Bauer

Issue: “(W)hether the U.S. Constitution requires that an offender be permitted during an enhanced sentence proceeding predicated on a prior conviction to challenge the prior conviction as unconstitutional because the conviction was allegedly based on a guilty plea that was not knowing,

State v. Todd E. Crider, 2000 WI App 84, 234 Wis. 2d 195, 610 N.W.2d 198
For Crider: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether jail time spent as a condition of probation qualifies as “actual confinement serving a criminal sentence,” so as to extend the § 939.62(2) 5-year period within which a prior conviction must fall to support a repeater enhancement.

Holding: Though time served as a condition of probation is generally not a “sentence,”

State v. Jeff S. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, 235 Wis.2d 220, 613 N.W.2d 186
For Mohr: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the frisk of a passenger, some 25 minutes after a routine traffic stop, was supported by reasonable belief that the person was armed.

Holding: The frisk was unlawful; because it “occurred approximately twenty-five minutes after the initial traffic stop, the most natural conclusion is that the frisk was a general precautionary measure,