On Point

City of Sheboygan v. Laura I. Flores, 229 Wis. 2d 242, 598 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999)

In a traffic regulation case, the docket entries – not any judgment or order – reflect the final determination and trigger the notice of appeal deadline.

Fedders v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Wis.2d 577, 601 N.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1999)

Issue: Whether a party may cross-appeal of right any interlocutory order after leave to appeal has been granted.

Holding: “(W)e hold that once leave to appeal has been granted, any other interlocutory order is appealable only by leave of this court. We dismiss the notices of cross-appeal filed in this appeal.”

State v. Timothy L. Olson, 226 Wis.2d 457, 595 N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Olson: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Holding:

Timothy L. Olson appeals from an order denying a postconviction motion for relief.  Olson seeks a 256-day sentence credit for the time he served in the Division of Intensive Sanctions (DIS) program before his probation was revoked and he was given a five-year prison sentence.  

.State v. Bobby G. Grant, 230 Wis.2d 90, 601 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Grant: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Grant’s waiver of jury trial was invalid because the trial court failed to advise that the verdict must be unanimous.

Holding: The procedure applicable to challenging guilty pleas, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) applies to this context;

State v. Joseph Schultz, 224 Wis.2d 499, 591 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Schultz: Robert R. Raehsler

Issue/Holding: A party in a civil case may seek relief from judgment under Wis. Stats., § 806.07. Where the basis for the motion is “mistake,” the primary question is whether the party’s conduct “was excusable under the circumstances.” Schultz should have been allowed to reopen a judgment so that he could litigate a crucial issue that he justifiably,

State v. Daniel C. Tuescher, 226 Wis.2d 465, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Tuescher: David D. Cook

Issue/Holding: Tusecher’s conviction on one count, out of several counts with concurrent sentences, was vacated for new trial. He continued to serve the remaining sentences, and was ultimately convicted and sentenced on a lesser offense on the vacated count. The court holds that Tuescher is not entitled to sentence credit on the resentenced count for time served between vacating and resentencing.

State v. Richard J. Kenyon, 225 Wis.2d 657, 593 N.W.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Kenyon: Rex Anderegg

Issue/Holding: Employee Retirement Income Security Act trumps Victims’ Rights. Kenyon was convicted of stealing about $150,000, and was ordered to pay restitution by “voluntarily” withdrawing funds from his pension fund. The COA reverses, holding that ERISA’s preemption of state attempts to assign or alienate pension benefits prohibits this effort to “create[] an equitable exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation clause.”

State v. Laura Walters, 224 Wis.2d 897, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Walters: Todd W. Bennett

Issue/Holding: Setoff is available to reduce the amount of special damages. The defendant has the burden of proving facts necessary to this defense. Since the victim here suffered general as well as special damages, Walters was therefore required to prove what part if any of a $25,000 insurance settlement went to special damages (given that the victim had also suffered general damages in an indeterminate amount).

State v. Laura Walters, 224 Wis.2d 897, 591 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Walters: Todd W. Bennett

Issue/Holding: The COA refuses to acknowledge accord and satisfaction as a restitution defense. Restitution, the court reasons, “is not a claim which a defendant owns, as a civil claim is. It is a remedy that belongs to the State.” While a goal is to make the victim whole, liability for restitution is grounded “on the State’s penal goals that affect the defendant,

State Richard J. Kenyon, 225 Wis.2d 657, 593 N.W.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Kenyon: Rex Anderegg

Holding: Kenyon’s change in position from trial to appeal doesn’t fall within estoppel doctrine, because neither prosecution nor trial court relied on the changed position.