On Point

State v. Joshua D. Schultz, Clark County Case No. 10-CM-138, 10/12/10

Clark County circuit court decision; for Schultz: William Poss, SPD Trial, Black River Falls

The complaint in this matter alleges that on June 10, 2010, the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon, a knife in the waistband of his pants which was covered by his shirt. The State alleges this is contrary to section 941.23, Wis. Stats.

State v. Salvador Cruz, 2010AP911-CR, District 2, 10/13/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Cruz: Matthew S. Pinix; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Evidence of the effect of the defendant’s (alleged disorderly) conduct was relevant, without a showing of “proximity” to that conduct:

¶13      A.S. instructs that “[i]n addition to considering the potential effects of a defendant’s conduct in disorderly conduct cases … prior cases also indicate that the actual effects of a defendant’s conduct are probative.”  Id.

Consolidated cases:

Camreta

Docket

Decision Below (9th Cir)

Question Presented (from SCOTUSblog):

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant, a court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances before law enforcement and child welfare officials may conduct a temporary seizure and interview at a public school of a child whom they reasonably suspect was being sexually abused.

Docket

Decision Below (New Mexico supreme court)

Question Presented:

Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the statements.

Cert. Petition

State’s Brief Opposing Cert

SCOTUSblog page

Follow-up to Melendez-Diaz v.

Nathan Y. v. Tarik T., 2010AP992, District IV, 10/7/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Tarik T.: Philip J. Brehm

The court rejects the argument that under Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶36, summary judgment is inappropriate when the ground alleged is abandonment.

¶7        …  First, Steven V. explained that its discussion of the use of summary judgment procedure on grounds proven by documentary evidence versus those proven by non-documentary evidence was not “mean[t] to imply that the general categorization of statutory grounds in this and the preceding paragraph represent a definitive statement about the propriety of summary judgment in any particular case.”  Id.

Grant Co. DSS v. Stacy K. S., 2010AP1678, District IV, 10/7/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Stacy K.: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

The circuit court may take the parent’s admission telephonically at the grounds phase of a TPR; neither § 48.422(7)(a) nor § 807.13 requires physical presence.

¶16      Addressing first the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 48.422(7)(a),  the plain import of the requirement that the court “[a]ddress the parties present” is that the court engage in an on-the-record discussion,

State v. Daniel H. Hanson, 2010 WI App 146 (recommended for publication), affirmed 2012 WI 4; for Hanson: Chad A. Lanning; case activity

Fleeing, § 346.04(3)

Can you criminally “flee” the police, if what you’re actually doing is driving to the nearest police station to escape what you believe to be a beating at the hands of the officer you’re fleeing?

court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); for Batt: Chad A. Lanning; BiC; Resp.; Reply

OWI – Implied Consent Law – § 343.305(5)(a) Testing

Construing State v. Stary, 187 Wis. 2d 266, 522 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1994), the court concludes that the Implied Consent law affords the driver the right to choose testing administered by the law enforcement agency at no expense to the driver,

City of Kenosha v. Elizabeth R. Tower, 2009AP1957, District 2, 10/6/10  

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Tower: Michael F. Torphy; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Because the police knew Tower was merely stopped temporarily for the purpose of dropping of a passenger – an explicit statutory exception to illegal parking – they didn’t have reasonable suspicion to temporarily seize her for illegal parking:

¶10 The City argues that like the officers in Renz,

State v. Javier Galvin, 2010AP863-CR, District 2, 10/6/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Galvin: John S. Schiro, Keith Llanas; BiC; Resp.

Galvan, who had minimal ability to understand English, didn’t understand the implied consent warnings given to him in English. Because the arresting officer knew of Galvan’s limitation, and had indeed obtained the translation services of another officer at the time of arrest,