Defense Wins: COA reverses commitment order and order to continue commitment based on insufficient evidence of dangerousness.
Jackson County v. D.C., 2025AP1838 & 2025AP1839, 4/23/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA reversed D.C.’s commitment order and the order extending his commitment because the County did not meet its burden to establish he was dangerous.
D.C.’s criminal case, for which he was incompetent to stand trial, was converted to a civil commitment proceeding and a court trial was held in December 2024 to resolve whether he was “dangerous” for purposes of Chapter 51.
A sheriff’s deputy testified that D.C.’s criminal case arose in July 2022 after he drove over 105 miles per hour to elude police. A psychiatrist testified that he “worried” about behavior that would occur during an “acute psychosis” event such as D.C.’s attempt to elude police, but was not aware whether D.C. was diagnosed as suffering from acute psychosis at the time of the incident. (¶ 5).
An employee of the mental health facility in which D.C. was confined during the criminal competency proceedings testified that he refused to go into his designated cell, became “increasingly aggressive,” punched the door of the cell and expressed “how he was going to kill us” after he was placed in the cell. (¶ 6). Another employee said D.C. refused to eat “several meals.” (¶ 7). The psychiatrist testified to a “significant impairment of oral intake” by D.C., but said he ate regularly after he was transferred to a different facility and did not see any indication of malnutrition. (¶ 7). Nevertheless, the psychiatrist was “concerned” that D.C. would be unable to satisfy his needs for nourishment, medical care, and safety and would be a danger to himself if left untreated. He acknowledged, however, that “I don’t know if his psychosis would worsen if he remained untreated” and did not “know for certain” whether D.C. would obtain services and treatment in the community if he was not committed. (¶ 8). A psychologist testified that D.C. lacked insight into his mental illness and was unlikely to seek treatment if he was not committed. (¶ 9).
The circuit court ordered D.C. committed for six months because it found him “dangerous” under the second (danger to others as defined by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.) and fifth standards (danger to himself if left untreated as defined by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.). (¶ 10).
The circuit court extended D.C.’s commitment in May 2025 based only on the fifth standard. A psychologist testified at the extension hearing that D.C. did not believe he has psychosis and, without medication, he would relapse into losing his cognitive and volitional control. (¶ 12). The psychologist said, due to “very pronounced and negative symptoms of schizophrenia,” D.C. was unable to function independently, lacks “basic self-preservation skills,” has “severe functional deficits,” and would not pursue services voluntarily because he does not believe he is mentally ill. (¶ 13).
On appeal, D.C. argued there was insufficient evidence that he was “dangerous” to order his initial commitment or to extend his commitment.
Regarding the initial commitment, the COA determined there was not sufficient evidence that D.C. presented a substantial probability of physical harm to others under the second standard to establish dangerousness. Although the Court acknowledged the eluding conduct placed others in reasonable fear of serious physical harm, it recognized there was not evidence to connect D.C.’s mental illness to the eluding incident because he was not evaluated at or near that time. (¶ 23). The Court considered that D.C. had a documented history of substance abuse, which might have factored into his attempt to elude police: “This murkiness about the circumstances of the eluding incident, combined with the passage of two and one-half years, meant that this incident had a low probative value in the assessment of dangerousness related to D.C.’s mental condition at the time of the commitment hearing.” (¶ 23).
The Court considered the eluding incident and D.C.’s threats to staff at the mental health facility too distant in time to meet the dangerousness standard. Readers interested in the nuances of Chapter 51 will want to review the Court’s discussion of the “recency definition” contained in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), which establishes for cases where a criminal case is converted to a civil commitment proceeding that a person’s acts during or subsequent to the time of the offense shall be deemed recent for assessing dangerousness. (¶¶ 26-36). Suffice to say the COA concluded the recency definition does not require “a court to engage in the fiction of treating factually distant events as if they had in fact occurred in the immediate past” because the “command is that the inquiry in a mental commitment proceeding must always be on whether the person is currently dangerous.” (¶ 35).
As for the fifth standard for dangerousness, the COA concluded the County did not meet its burden to show there was a substantial probability that D.C. needs care or treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration because the psychiatrist was “entirely noncommittal” whether he would deteriorate absent commitment. (¶ 38). Nor did the COA find that D.C. would suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm if he is not treated as required for commitment under § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. Although the psychiatrist testified that D.C.’s “nutrition would compromise” if he is not treated, his finding was based on the isolated incident of D.C. missing some meals while he was institutionalized and there was no evidence that he was currently underweight or “nutritionally compromised.” (¶ 40).
Finally, the COA concluded the evidence at the extension hearing was insufficient to continue D.C.’s commitment. The Court considered the psychologist’s testimony that D.C. lacked “volition” and the ability to problem solve “generic statements that could mean many things, some meeting the standard and some not meeting it.” (¶ 41). More concrete evidence, such as “specific examples of D.C. having trouble fulfilling basic needs, or an explanation as to how D.C.’s alleged lack of ‘volition’ was likely to cause him serious mental, physical, or emotional harm,” was necessary to meet the County’s burden. (¶ 41).