COA addresses multi-pronged attack on TPR orders and affirms
State v. J.G., III,, 2025AP469-474, 5/15/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity
Although J.G. levies a number of appellate attacks, COA finds his arguments uniformly unavailing and affirms.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: Continuing CHIPS
John argues that the State failed to prove DMCPS made reasonable efforts in light of his alleged “cognitive and socioeconomic limitations.” (¶12). Although John suggests that DMCPS had an obligation to ensure he participated in a psychological evaluation, the record shows that John failed to attend a scheduled evaluation and DMCPS had no obligation to somehow “order” his participation. (¶15). Moreover, the record does not clearly support his contention that his struggles were overwhelming as “John never reported that he had any disabilities or concerns about his mental health and memory, only that he had some ‘difficulty learning in school.'” (Id.). John also “noticeably omits those facts” which contradict his sufficiency argument. (¶16).
John also focuses on evidence regarding his alleged failure to ensure the children’s safety by not taking reports of sexual abuse by a grandfather seriously. (¶17). In his view, DMCPS did not provide him adequate information about the alleged disclosures, so it was “impossible” for him to adequately determine the appropriate response. (Id.). Once again, John is faulted for omitting “key facts that work against him” and COA disagrees that this was an “impossible” condition under Jodie W. (¶19).
Finally, John focuses on the claim that he failed to fulfill a condition regarding the provision of a “safe and clean home” for the children by living in a camper with his eight children. (¶20). John argues that DMCPS needed to do more to assist him with housing insecurity and claims his parental rights cannot be terminated because of poverty alone. (Id.). COA declares that, “While securing a home for a family of eight on a single salary may be difficult, it is not technically impossible.” (¶21). Moreover, DMCPS “was not under an obligation to secure housing for the family.” (Id.). Further, the evidence on this point focused not only on the lack of housing but the condition of a home that was said to be in “deplorable” condition. (¶22).
Sufficiency of the Evidence: Failure to Assume Parental Responsibility
Intriguingly, the circuit court at this bench trial concluded the State failed to prove this ground with respect to three of the children but proved it with respect to three others. (¶26). John seizes on this as a logical incongruity; however, COA finds there was nothing improper about the court finding the State had failed to meet its burden with respect to some children given the unique facts of the case. (¶27). Second, John claims the court overemphasized John’s post-removal behavior. (¶29). COA finds that the record does not support the argument. (Id.). Third, John makes a superficially argument that some of the foster parent’s testimony about the diagnoses of the children and their reaction to visitation was expert testimony and should not have been admitted via a lay witness. (¶30). John doesn’t support the argument with a proper record citation, however, and appears not to have objected below. (¶31). Finally, John points to a “mutual desire” visitation order as improperly influencing the outcome. (¶32). However, the order in question post-dates the finding of unfitness and, in any case, John stipulated to that order. (¶33). He is therefore dinged for his “disingenuous and improper” argument. (Id.).
Dispositional Order
Finally, John claims the court erroneously exercised its authority when it determined termination was in the best interest of the children. (¶35). John makes a battery of fact-specific allegations, all of which fail under the exceptionally deferential standard of review applicable here.