COA affirms TPR orders over sufficiency challenges
State v. M.G., 2025AP2883-2888, 5/15/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity
M.G. appeals orders terminating her parental rights to her six children on the basis that the circuit court erred when it found that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that child protective services made reasonable efforts and she failed to assume parental responsibility for the three youngest children. COA affirms.
“Molly” argues that the state failed to prove the department made reasonable efforts to help her follow all of the recommendations stemming from her psychological evaluation and provide her with medication management to fulfill the requirements of the CHIPS dispositional orders. (¶14). COA analyzes the evidence of the social worker’s actions and concludes that they were reasonable, as Molly found her own therapist, was often “hostile” and “very, very antagonistic and uncooperative” with the assigned worker, and refused medication management. (¶¶16-33).
As to failure to assume parental responsibility, Molly argues that the circuit court inappropriately distinguished the siblings into two groups based on how long they had been in out-of-home care and that she parented the children as much as she was allowed once they had been removed. (¶35). COA holds that the court did take into consideration the fact that the three children had been in out-of-home care for a significant part of their lives and acknowledged that served as an obstacle to Molly’s ability to parent, but that the evidence still demonstrated that Molly had neglected and exposed them to hazardous living conditions. (¶¶36-39). COA then details the neglect and hazards to which the children were exposed. (¶¶40-43).
A note to anyone litigating reasonable efforts with an intellectually disabled client-
In determining that DMCPS made reasonable efforts, the Court relied heavily on State v. Raymond C. However, courts should not be relying on Raymond C. because, at the time it was decided, the statute did not require that the agency take into account the characteristics of the parent. At the time of Raymond C., agencies were required to make a “diligent effort to provide the services ordered by the court.” Raymond C., 187 Wis. 2d at 14. Case law defined “diligent effort” as “reasonable, earnest, and energetic effort.” Id. at 15 (citing In re D.P., 170 Wis. 2d 313, 331-32, 488 N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992)). The Wisconsin jury instruction stated “[t]he words ‘diligent effort’ mean that the department has acted reasonably, using ordinary and reasonable diligence, such as is customarily exercised by other departments under the same or similar circumstances. It requires an earnest and energetic effort.” Id. at 15 (citing WIS JI CIVIL—7040).
A year after Raymond C. was decided, the legislature added section 48.415(b)(1) defining diligent effort: “‘diligent effort’ means an earnest and conscientious effort to take good faith steps to provide the services ordered by the court which takes into consideration the parent or child, the level of cooperation of the parent and other relevant circumstances in this case.” 1995 WI Act 275, § 77. Two years later, the legislature changed the word “diligent” to “reasonable,” creating the statute that we have now. 1997 WI Act 237, §§ 141-42. Thus, at the time Raymond C. was decided, there was no requirement that the agency consider the characteristics of the parent when providing services.