COA finds officer’s reference to an “automatic” revocation did not render consent to blood draw involuntary
City of Mequon v. Scott Sarver Lindvall, 2025AP1703, 5/13/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Although Lindvall seizes on the officer’s word choice in discussing the consequences of refusing to consent to an evidentiary blood draw, the Court ultimately finds his arguments unavailing and affirms.
Lindvall left a bourbon tasting at a country club and tried to drive back home with a BAC of .178. His trip was cut short when he crashed his car through the tree line, triggering the deployment of airbags. (¶2). The officer’s investigation into the crash ultimately led her to arrest Lindvall for an OWI offense. (¶4). Lindvall was read the Informing the Accused Form. (¶5). A lengthy back and forth ensued, with Lindvall repeatedly expressing his unwillingness to consent. (Id.). The appeal focuses on the following statement from the officer in attempting to confirm if Lindvall was refusing to consent given his statements and questions to the officer :
Ok, so you have to, you, you have to you either submit to it or not, so, we can’t wait for a lawyer or anything like that, we can’t say anything that will convince you otherwise, understand that if you refuse then that is automatic revocation of your driver status, um … so … that’s kinda, that’s what they mean by saying that there’s, um, other penalties that kinda go along with that. So, at this time, right now, are you willing to submit to a test of your blood?
(Id.). Lindvall answered no. (Id.). However, that was not the end of the story, as Lindvall continued to re-engage the officer on this same topic and appeared to equivocate. (¶6). Lindvall ultimately consented. (Id.).
Following an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress, Lindvall renews his argument on appeal that “his consent was not voluntary because it was the product of improper coercion stemming from what he says was misleading information and that his consent was merely ‘acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.'” (¶15). Although the parties disagree as to how that claim should be analyzed, COA begins, as Lindvall requests, with the Fourth Amendment. (¶21).
Lindvall argues that his consent was not voluntary and was actually coerced by the officer’s misstatement that refusal would lead to “automatic” revocation. (¶27). Thus, although the Informed Consent statute uses the phrase “will be revoked” to describe what will happen to a person’s license following a refusal, Lindvall points out that “revocation is “automatic” only where an individual fails to request a refusal hearing and that if an individual does request a refusal hearing, that individual may ultimately prevail and not have his license revoked at all.” (Id.).
The court refuses to recognize this nuance, however, and concludes that the officer accurately stated the law as set forth in § 343.305(4). (Id.). In reaching that conclusion, it relies heavily on its prior decision in Cormican, which presented a nearly-identical set of facts. (Id.). It is also disinclined to find that the officer misstated the law as this would imply that the informing the accused statute misleads the person by failing to inform that license revocation may not occur if the person timely requests a refusal hearing and prevails. (Id.). Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, COA is therefore “satisfied that Lindvall voluntarily consented to the blood draw: there was no misrepresentation, he was not physically threatened, he was cooperative, and he was informed multiple times that he could refuse consent and that the decision was his and his alone. Although he did waiver initially as to his decision, he ultimately consented—and he did so after Officer Campbell repeatedly clarified she could not sway him or force him one way or the other.” (¶30). COA therefore rejects Lindvall’s reliance on Blackman, where Blackman, unlike Lindvall, could not be revoked at all. (¶31).
Having concluded there is no Fourth Amendment issue, COA concludes there is no Quelle problem, either, and affirms. (¶32).
As this is (at least) the second time that this issue has presented itself, Lindvall has a better-than-usual petition for review. COA’s decision leans heavily on its prior decision in Cormican but there was no PFR there. Moreover, we are a little troubled by COA’s assertion that it should avoid finding Lindvall’s consent involuntary, as doing so would call into question the language of the Informing the Accused statute. But if Lindvall’s right that the language in the statute suggests inevitable license revocation when this is not factually accurate, should that matter for purposes of analyzing the Fourth Amendment?