COA interprets deferred judgment agreement and finds State was permitted to move to revoke outside of deferral period
State of Wisconsin v. Derrick John Grignon, 2024AP1595-CR, 4/28/26, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
In a decision recommended for publication, COA applies contract law principles to a deferred judgment agreement and finds that the State properly moved to revoke the agreement following Grignon’s noncompliance with its terms.
Grignon resolved his case by pleading guilty and entering into a deferred judgment agreement (DJA). (¶5). The agreement asked the court to defer judgment for a period of 24 months. (Id.). If Grignon successfully completed the conditions, including not committing new crimes, then the State agreed to move for dismissal “at the end of the deferral period.” (Id.). Grignon was further required to file “proof of compliance” at the end of the deferral period. (Id.). The contract further specified that failure to provide such documentation could result in termination of the DJA. (Id.).
The circuit court accepted the agreement and calendared a review hearing for one day after the 24 month deferral period. (¶6). There was no objection to the court setting this hearing outside the deferral period. Id. However, one week before the review hearing, the court rescheduled that hearing on its own motion. (¶7). The State then filed a motion to revoke, alleging that Grignon had committed new felony offenses roughly one year earlier (during the deferral period). Id. The motion was obviously filed outside of the 24 month deferral period. Id. Grignon failed to appear at the review hearing and a bench warrant was issued. Id. When he ultimately appeared in court, he asked the court to deny the State’s motion to revoke, arguing that because it was filed outside of the deferral period it was untimely. (¶8). He asked for specific performance. Id. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the DJA had been constructively extended and that the State’s filing was therefore timely. (¶10). Grignon appeals.
On appeal, COA opts not to follow the reasoning of the circuit court and affirms for different reasons. COA holds that a DJA is a contract and, following its decision in Kaczmarski (applying to DPAs), holds that contract law principles govern the interpretation of its provisions. (¶12). Ultimately, it relies on the proof of completion provision, which “provided that Grignon could not fully comply with the conditions of the DJA until he filed his proof of compliance at the end of the deferral period.” (¶14). Because the contract allows the State to file for revocation if that document is not filed (an event that must necessarily occur outside the 24 month deferral period), the contract therefore explicitly contemplates the kind of post-deferral period revocation motion at issue here. Id. COA therefore rejects Grignon’s reliance on language elsewhere in the contract that seems to limit the State’s ability to revoke to the deferral period, as this “would have required the State to move to revoke or terminate the agreement before it had knowledge of Grignon’s full compliance with the agreement’s conditions.” (¶16). Accordingly, COA affirms.
You might be wondering why this relatively fact-specific decision about a specific contract is recommended for publication. As far as we can tell, this is the first decision to address the interpretation of DJAs, as opposed to DPAs, a novel distinction likely motivating the recommendation for publication.