COA upholds traffic stop for suspicion of excessive window tint
State v. Ryan Alan Stenner, 2025AP503-CR, 5/7/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA applies general reasonable suspicion principles to reverse the circuit court’s order granting suppression for a traffic stop based on overly dark window tint. It holds that the circuit court applied the wrong standard, the officer’s testimony was sufficiently connected to his training, and the administrative code related to window tint is valid and enforceable.
An officer stopped Stenner’s vehicle because he suspected a window tint violation. (¶2). The officer had attended a training in vehicle window tinting a few weeks before the stop. (¶5). He testified at the suppression hearing that he’d learned about the different types of glass installed during the original manufacturing in passenger vehicles and that the type used in a vehicle is typically identified by a mylar decal on the window, as well as “aftermarket” tinting. (¶¶6-7).
As to Stenner’s vehicle, the officer “‘observed that the rear back wind[ow] appeared to be entirely covered in aftermarket tint,’ and that the window appeared to him to be as dark as a front windshield band, or, in other words, in the teens to single digit percentage range of light transmission.” (¶8). He tested some of the windows with a tint meter, which reported about 14% light transmission. (¶9). When the officer asked Stenner to open his car door in order to check the mylar decal, he saw drug paraphernalia in the door handle. (¶¶2, 9). He then found cocaine. (¶10).
The circuit court granted Stenner’s motion to suppress and the state appealed. The state argues the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Stenner’s car for a possible violation of the rear window tinting rule. Stenner argues the circuit court’s ruling was correct, or, in the alternative, that the rear window tinting rule is invalid and unenforceable. (¶12).
Suspected traffic violations may form the basis for reasonable suspicion and allow a police officer to conduct a traffic stop. The traffic code at issue here, the rear window tinting rule, permits: (1) manufacturer-applied tinting during the original manufacturing process with no specified percentage of visible light penetration; and (2) aftermarket tinting that requires at least 35% of visible light to pass through the window. (¶16). COA concludes the officer had reasonable suspicion of a rear window tint violation because his training was recent and he testified Stenner’s rear window tint appeared equivalent to the tint on a front windshield band, which allowed him to reasonably infer it therefore violated the 35% light transmission rule for aftermarket tints. (¶21). The visible tint also supported a reasonable inference that it was not installed by the original manufacturer. (¶23).
Despite the appellate court’s independent review as to reasonable suspicion, it “note[s] that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard when it determined that ‘where there is at best a 50 percent chance that the law is in fact being violated, the officer does not have the reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.'” The court erred as a matter of law in applying a “50 percent chance” standard to the reasonable suspicion test. (¶25).
Stenner contends that the COA’s published decision in Conaway, where COA rejected a stop as unreasonable when that stop was based on a mere belief that the driver had “dark window tint” without accompanying proof that the officer was able to distinguish between lawful and unlawful tint levels, supports the circuit court’s decision. (¶27). COA, however, finds Conaway distinguishable. Here, the officer did more than make a bald assertion that the window appeared overly dark; instead, his “testimony established the connections between his training about vehicle glass, window tint and windshield bands, his experience in observing non-tinted windows and the darkness of windshield bands, and how he applied his training and experience to his observations of Stenner’s car to develop reasonable suspicion that Stenner’s rear window violated the rear window tinting rule.” (¶28).
COA rejects Stenner’s argument that the rear window tinting rule, WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Trans 305.32(5)(b)2., is invalid and unenforceable, concluding that the department has the authority to promulgate rules regarding vehicle equipment, which includes window tinting,
and law enforcement may enforce administrative rules on window tinting. (¶31). The court conducts a plain language analysis of the relevant statutes and administrative rules to come to this conclusion. (¶¶31-36).
COA therefore reverses the circuit court’s order granting Stenner’s motion to suppress.