Seventh Circuit cases for February, March and April
The last several months brought some interesting cases, including several non-Wisconsin habeas appeals, a Wisconsin-originating challenge to a law criminalizing the possession of a firearm by a felon, the distinction between “l” and “d” meth, a few Fourth Amendment issues and some Wisconsin-originating § 1983 claims that might be interesting to at least some of our readers.
February:
United States of America v. Antonio Carrazco-Martinez, No. 24-2819: This case involves some of the more intrusive forms of government surveillance–the use of a cell-site simulator and placement of a hidden camera. However, both techniques were approved after the filing of an affidavit seeking a warrant, so the burden is on Carrazco-Martinez to show a lack of good faith. Carrazco-Martinez makes some interesting arguments about deficiencies in the warrant application(s), but, ultimately, his arguments are unavailing.
Johnnie E. Russell v. Ryan Comstock, Colin Powell, and Dave Wohlgemuth, No. 24-1100: This is a Racine-originating § 1983 case in which Russell challenges the warrantless “sweep” of his residence. The claim fails on qualified immunity grounds and, in analyzing the issue, the opinion contains a helpful summary of cases explaining the exigent circumstances exception at issue here.
United States of America v. Donald A. Stenson, No. 23-2166: Stenson pleaded guilty and the record reflects a (mostly) solid colloquy. However, he moved for presentencing plea withdrawal under the “fair and just” reason standard, arguing that he felt pressured and was under the influence of a new medication which lists side effects which (he maintains) impact the validity of his plea. Notably, the lower court neglected to ask Stenson about medication usage. However, the overall colloquy, coupled with the court’s observations about his demeanor and apparent understanding, defeat his plea withdrawal claim.
United States of America v. Eunice D. Salley, No. 22-3278: Salley waived her right to counsel but now argues that the lower court erred in permitting her to go pro se. Notably, the record does not show that the circuit conducted a “formal” Faretta hearing. Yet, the overall record shows that the required warnings were provided to Salley throughout the lifespan of the case. Moreover, the record supports a conclusion that Salley made an informed decision.
March:
Michael J. Connor v. Brittany Greene, No. 23-1595: Connor claims on habeas review that his lawyer was ineffective for not advising him, prior to rejecting a plea, of a possible mandatory life sentence if he went to trial. Connor must prove, however, that he would have accepted a plea and the lower court reasonably relied on Connor’s repeated assertions of innocence in finding otherwise.
Christopher P. Raddant v. Douglas County, Wisconsin, No. 24-3293: Included for Douglas County readers, here the Court affirms a ruling that officers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Raddant’s claim they acted too roughly in arresting Raddant for suspected bail violations.
United States of America v. Floyd L. Suggs, No. 24-2892: Officers obtained a warrant to search a home in connection with a drug investigation. The warrant misstated the residence as a single family home when, in fact, it was a duplex. However, while this renders the warrant overbroad, that does not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. “Rather, if when agents obtain a warrant they neither knew nor should have known that a building contained multiple units, we will uphold the warrant.” Here, officers conducted a sufficient investigation and reasonably believed the address was a single-family home. Moreover, the execution of the search warrant was not unreasonable, as once officers learned the home was a duplex, they confined their search to Suggs’s unit. In addition, because Suggs fled into the unit under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable belief he was about to destroy drug evidence, exigent circumstances permitted entry to that unit and the plain view doctrine justifies what the officers discovered therein.
Ryan Steinhoff v. Matthew Malovrh, No. 24-1252: A § 1983 case potentially relevant to Taylor County readers, here the Court concludes that Steinhoff’s claim that Malovrh struck him in the head with a rifle butt during a contested police encounter is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and should be submitted to a jury.
William Clyde Gibson III v. Ron Neal, No. 25-2779: This case is notable inasmuch as it shows how SCOTUS’s recent precedent has narrowed the scope of habeas litigation. Gibson is currently attempting to establish equitable tolling for not timely filing his habeas petition. Although there is no dispute that the district court has authority to conduct a limited hearing to determine if Gibson’s mental health is a factor in the equitable tolling analysis, the district court did not have authority to transport Gibson to a separate facility for mental health testing.
April:
United States of America v. Glen Prince, No. 23-3155: Prince mounted a facial challenge to the federal equivalent of the FIPOF statute and succeeded in the district court. While the Court seemingly cracks the door open for as applied challenges, it holds there is no plausible basis the law is unconstitutional on its face and reverses.
United States of America v. Edlando M. Watson, No. 24-2432: As many readers know, the issue of firearm regulation post-Bruen and Rahimi has proven to be a dynamic issue that has inspired a lot of interesting litigation, with many Wisconsin advocates following the lead of the Third Circuit in challenging at least some felon in possession charges under a theory that the Second Amendment does not permit the disarmament of nonviolent felons. Here, the Seventh engages with the topic in a dense decision that covers all the usual arguments and is a must-read for any litigator pursuing such a claim. Notably, the Seventh ultimately concludes that while the Second Amendment permits the disarming of a dangerous felon (and a drug dealer, for these purposes, is dangerous) it concedes the ground is less settled when discussing nonviolent felons and therefore leaves that more thorny question for another day.
William Walls v. Erin Posey, No. 24-1509: Walls was involuntarily committed as a sexually violent person and has raised an interesting issue regarding the use of “statements that he or a person treating him made while he was in prison.” He loses, however, on procedural grounds that are too complicated to try and explain in this breezy digest. However, we thought the case notable as the Court is frustrated by the lengthy delay in the Illinois appellate courts. The Court once again references its decision in Carter v. Buesgen where it “excoriated” Wisconsin for permitting a four-year delay in resolving a criminal appeal and reminds the reader that individuals on the receiving end of such delays may have cause to proceed to federal court when state court systems prove inadequate.
John Doe v. University of Southern Indiana, No. 24-2245: Doe was suspended following a Title IX investigation into an alleged sexual assault. He sued the University and learned via discovery about records which were apparently withheld from him that could be read to call into question the decision of the University. This case, however, concerns a side issue: Whether Doe gets to proceed with a pseudonym. The Court says no, forcing Doe to make the decision to either publicly reveal his identity or dismiss his lawsuits.
United States of America v. Lennie Perry, No. 24-2327: Perry waived his right to counsel following a proper colloquy but apparently changed his mind mid-trial and requested that counsel be appointed to assist him. The Seventh identifies two justifications for denying that request. First, once a person properly waives the right to counsel, the court is entitled to treat that waiver as binding, especially when the change of heart occurs mid-trial. Second, the record shows that Perry clashed with a number of appointed lawyers and “The Sixth Amendment does not entitle a defendant to an endless succession of appointed counsel.” “When a defendant has repeatedly refused to cooperate with his court-appointed attorneys, it is within a judge’s discretion to announce that no new attorneys will be provided and to require the defendant to either work with his current attorney or proceed pro se.”
Marwan Mahajni v. Vu Do & Scott Woida, No. 24-3175: We posted about the state court criminal appeal back in 2019, when Mahajni persuaded the Court of Appeals that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that bailiffs improperly communicated with the jury and advised them that a hung jury was not a permissible outcome. It turns out that Mahajni’s conviction was later reversed and the State declined to re-prosecute him. Mahajni is now pursuing a § 1983 claim against these two officers, both of whom were denied qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage by the district court. One of the officers, Woida, appeals. However, the Seventh rejects Woida’s appeal as not properly before the court, as the decision with respect to Woida was not final. The district court’s oral ruling stated that it lacked necessary information about Woida’s claim and explicitly contemplated his ability to re-raise that issue with additional information.
Jane Doe 1 v. Steven v. Sloan, Nos. 25-1917, 25-1918 & 25-1919: Here’s an interesting case which highlights the peril of relying on auxiliary or part-time officers in child porn cases, as it turns out that this agency’s IT expert was, in fact, a pedophile who was later caught possessing evidence he had previously helped “analyze.” However, the Court denies the victims’ attempt at redress via a § 1983 claim.
United States of America v. Omari Andrews, Jr., No. 25-1904: Andrews challenged the admissibility of expert testimony regarding latent fingerprint analysis that depended in part on the expert’s manipulation of an image using Photoshop. The Seventh fails to see an erroneous exercise of discretion in admitting that evidence and affirms.
Jerrel Perez v. Shawn Guetschow, No. 25-1617: Officer Guetschow is a police officer in Kenosha. He also has a second job as a “security officer” with the Kenosha Unified School District. In reaction to a “confrontation” between two sixth graders, Guetschow took one of the children to the ground and knelt on her neck before placing her in handcuffs. The Court affirms the district court’s order denying Guetschow’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and holds that “[o]nly a trial will reveal what happened.”
Wisconsinites for Alternatives to Smoking & Tobacco Inc. v. David Casey, No. 25-2565: In 2023, Wisconsin adopted a new law which effectively outlawed many “vape” devices and subjected businesses who sell those devices to monetary forfeitures. Here, the Seventh Circuit upholds the district court’s decision denying a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that “Wisconsinites have failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that Wisconsin Statute § 995.15 is preempted by federal law.”
United States of America v. Glenn D. Wooden, No. 24-2702: Some readers might remember the recent Johnson case, which addressed whether the State needed to prove a substance in a driver’s blood was “L meth” (which is contained in some over the counter products) or “d meth.” Here, Wooden makes a similar argument regarding his possession of methamphetamine under federal law. Like the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the Seventh Circuit concludes the l-meth versus d-meth distinction is not a defense to criminal prosecution.