Defense win: COA reverses TPR dispositional order
Waupaca County Department of Health & Human Services v. C.J.T., 2026AP794, 6/11/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
CJT appeals the circuit court order terminating his parental rights to his son, JJT, arguing that the court failed to demonstrate that it considered all of the required factors at disposition. Despite the deferential standard of review to a TPR dispositional order, COA agrees, reversing the termination order and remanding for a proper exercise of discretion.
JJT was placed with CJT’s sister pursuant to a CHIPS order when he was about 18 months old. He was later moved to a foster home. The county petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights to JJT when he was nearly 4 years old. The circuit court granted summary judgment against CJT on the ground of abandonment. (¶2).
At the dispositional hearing, a social worker testified that JJT had not formed a substantial relationship with either of his parents, who had been incarcerated for most of his life, but had strong and positive relationships with his foster family. (¶3). CJT testified that he did not have a relationship with his son, but that terminating his rights would harm JJT later in life due to his own life experience. (¶4). The circuit court then explicitly referenced 5 of the 6 required statutory factors during its explanation of its decision. (¶5).
COA notes that “[a] close review of the transcript reveals that the circuit court made no reference of any kind to the substantial-relationships factor in WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c). This factor asks: “Whether the child has substantial relationships with the parent or other family members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever these relationships.” (¶6).
CJT argues that § 48.426(3) directs that a circuit court determining disposition “shall consider” all six listed factors, and the record here does not reveal any consideration of one of the six. COA agrees with CJT that the circuit court’s omission demonstrates a failure to “appl[y] a proper standard of law,” and therefore the court erroneously exercised its discretion. (¶¶11, 16). In doing so, COA rejects the county’s arguments that the evidence at the hearing renders the circuit court’s decision a proper exercise of discretion, and alternatively, that the court of appeals should affirm because a preponderance of the evidence supports the disposition even if it is the result of an erroneous exercise of judgment. (¶¶13-14). Thus, COA concludes that remand is the appropriate remedy. (¶17).