SCOTUS reverses and holds that appellate court erroneously considered newly-discovered evidence in ruling against defendant
Whitton v. Dixon, USSC No. 25-580, 6/1/2026, reversing a per curiam decision of the 11th Circuit, Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
In an unusual defense win involving “peculiar” conduct by the Eleventh Circuit, SCOTUS wades through the thicket of habeas law and reverse and remands for further consideration of Whitton’s Giglio claim.
Whitton was convicted, in part, based on the testimony from a jailhouse snitch who testified at trial that he had no prior criminal record. (p.1). This was untrue and the State knew it. (Id.). The snitch had been previously charged in juvenile court with a number of serious crimes. (Id.). Ultimately, Whitton pursued habeas relief, arguing that this is a due process violation under the Court’s holding in Giglio. (Id.). When his appeal ultimately reached the Eleventh Circuit, it agreed with the merits of Whitton’s claim. (p.2). It also rejected an argument that this error was harmless because of a Florida evidentiary rule prohibiting impeachment with the use of a juvenile record. (Id.). Notably, the evidentiary rule contains an exception when the witness opens the door by claiming they have no prior record–exactly what happened here. ( Id.). It also agreed that impeachment on this topic would have undermined the witness’s credibility. (Id.).
However, the State also argued that the state courts had already determined that there could be no prejudice to Whitton, as the witness’s testimony as a whole was “immaterial to the jury’s verdict.” (Id.). Under AEDPA, that determination is owed deference unless it is objectively unreasonable. (p.3). Thus, “the key question for the Court of Appeals was whether the Florida Supreme Court’s determination about the rest of the evidence was a reasonable one.” (Id.).
To resolve that question, the Eleventh Circuit relied in part on new blood testing evidence developed postconviction which appeared to show that the victim’s blood was on Whitton’s boots. (Id.). The Court labels this a “peculiar” act and faults the lower court for assessing the impact of the witness’s testimony on the jury by referencing evidence that jury never saw. (p.4). Accordingly, it vacates “the judgment because that court should not have considered the post-trial DNA evidence in assessing whether the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that [the witness’s] testimony was immaterial to the jury’s verdict. Because the post-trial DNA evidence was not presented to the jury (indeed, did not exist at the time of the trial), that evidence could not have influenced the jury’s verdict. It therefore sheds no light on whether (or to what extent) [the witness’s] testimony influenced that verdict.” (Id.). The matter is therefore remanded for reconsideration of Whitton’s claim under the proper legal standard.