COA affirms TPR order and denial of postdisposition motion
Pierce County Dept of Human Services v. K.D.B., 2025AP2643, 6/30/26, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
“Kevin” appeals the order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, and an order denying his motion for postdisposition relief. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict and his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance at the grounds trial. He also argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by concluding that the termination of his parental rights was in his daughter’s best interests. COA affirms.
The county filed a petition to terminate Kevin’s parental rights to “Kylie” in December 2023, alleging as grounds continuing CHIPS and failure to assume parental responsibility. (¶2). The court held a jury trial, and the jury returned a unanimous verdict that grounds existed to terminate Kevin’s parental rights to Kylie due to continuing CHIPS and due to failure to assume parental responsibility (¶¶3, 20). The circuit court then held a dispositional hearing, after which it made findings and concluded that it was in Kylie’s best interests to terminate Kevin’s parental rights. (¶¶21-22).
Kevin’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim focuses on his trial attorney’s failure to object to certain testimony and the admission of a report related to his 2021 parenting assessment. (¶¶23, 28). He contends that the evidence was inappropriate for the grounds phase, and his counsel’s failures allowed the jury to rely on “expert recommendations” that returning Kylie to Kevin would harm Kylie and not be in her best interests. In its order denying Kevin’s postdisposition motion, the circuit court found that trial counsel’s strategy, generally, was to show that the county was biased against Kevin and, pertaining specifically to this evidence, counsel’s strategy was to emphasize the amount of time that lapsed between the assessment and the TPR petition. (¶32). COA agrees that counsel’s strategy was objectively reasonable, as counsel decided not to object to the evidence, which tended to show the county was biased because it did not want Kylie to be returned to Kevin’s care long before the TPR. (¶33).
Next, Kevin argued the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on continuing CHIPS, specifically as to its burden to prove it made a reasonable effort to provide services, and that Kevin failed to meet the conditions established for Kylie’s return. (¶¶36-37). COA concludes that “Kevin’s argument largely consists of asking [the court] to reweigh the evidence,” which it is unable to do under the standard of review. (¶38). COA finds there was ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict that the county made reasonable efforts to provide the services ordered by the circuit court, and that Kevin failed to meet the conditions for Kylie’s return to his home, as he frequently missed scheduled visits, did not act appropriately at some visits, failed to complete the programming provided and follow recommendations, failed to maintain complete sobriety, and failed to participate in Kylie’s care and treatment. (¶39).
Finally, Kevin argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion during the disposition phase of the TPR process by failing to conduct an “on-the-record analysis” of the best interests factors and by placing “excessive weight on the jury’s finding of unfitness. (¶40). COA concludes that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion as to disposition, as it “clearly addressed each of the best interest factors and applied the evidence from the hearing to the factors. (¶43).