COA affirms TPR order in appeal challenging sufficiency of the state’s “reasonable efforts” and ADA compliance
State v. G.L., 2026AP865, 7/1/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity
“Gwen” challenges the termination of her rights to her child, “Annie,” on the basis that the state presented insufficient evidence to the jury that the Division of Milwaukee Child Welfare (DMCW) made a reasonable effort to provide her with court-ordered services and that DMCW did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). COA affirms.
Annie was placed with a family member shortly after her birth, when it was determined that Gwen was unable to care for her. When Annie was around 2.5 years old, DMCW placed her in foster care and filed a CHIPS petition. Annie was diagnosed with autism, and Gwen was intellectually disabled and had mental health issues. (¶2). DMCW arranged a psychological evaluation, offered therapy, conducted a parenting assessment and provided parenting education to Gwen. (¶¶5-8). Gwen’s case manager also set up visitation and made additional efforts to support Gwen. (¶¶9-10). Ultimately, the state filed a TPR petition on the ground of continuing CHIPS, and a jury found that DMCW made reasonable efforts to provide the court-ordered services, that Gwen failed to meet the conditions for Annie’s safe return, and that there was no substantial likelihood that Gwen would meet those conditions. (¶11).
Gwen contends that the state failed to meet its burden as to “reasonable efforts” because its provision of services did not sufficiently take into account her intellectual disability. COA disagrees and concludes that there is ample credible evidence that DMCW made reasonable efforts to provide court-ordered services to Gwen for the reasons listed above, focusing on the specifically tailored, one-on-one assistance that DMCW attempted to provide to Gwen, much of which she did not accept. (¶¶14-17).
Next, COA rejects Gwen’s ADA noncompliance claim, as she failed to raise it in the circuit court, and it is barred by Wisconsin law. Gwen admits “that the ADA was never even mentioned, and that its applicability to the TPR proceedings was never argued or briefed before the circuit court.” She therefore waived the claim. (¶20). Further, Wisconsin law holds that the ADA does not define or increase the duties of child welfare agencies to provide court-ordered services, and is not a defense to TPR proceedings, and COA cannot do as Gwen asks, and overrule the case that held as much, State v. Raymond C., 187 Wis. 2d 10, 16-17, 522 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994). (¶21).
Finally, COA quickly disposes of Gwen’s additional arguments, which seem to be based on the sufficiency and ADA challenges, holding that it “already rejected these arguments and will not address them further.” (¶22).