COA rejects sufficiency and DJW arguments and affirms ch. 51 extension
Racine County v. P.L., , 2026AP132, 7/8/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects P.L.’s arguments that the county failed to introduce clear and convincing evidence to support a conclusion that he is dangerous under the second standard (via the recommitment standard) and the circuit court failed to make specific factual findings, and affirms.
Dangerousness
P.L.’s first argument is that the county failed to prove he was dangerous and that the circuit court based its conclusion that he was dangerous on hearsay in the doctor’s report. (¶12). COA concludes that the evidence of P.L.’s “aggressions, as evidenced by the bar fight, his habitual law-breaking causing him to be in and out of jail, and his own admission that he thinks about killing and raping children, are specific enough to support the commitment.” The court acknowledges that thoughts alone are insufficient, but concludes that P.L.’s actions, combined with his statements related to his thoughts, are “more than sufficient.” (¶13).
COA also rejects P.L.’s argument that the court relied on hearsay evidence from the doctor because P.L. only objected to the admission of the report, and did not object during the doctor’s testimony. (¶15). COA holds that to the extent P.L. now tries to challenge the doctor’s testimony or the circuit court’s reliance on that testimony in making the dangerousness determination, he has forfeited that claim. (¶17). As to the report, COA’s analysis is that the admission was proper because the law permits physician
expert witnesses to rely on hearsay in forming their opinions. (¶18). Thus, COA concludes that the circuit court’s determination that the county proved by clear and convincing evidence that P.L. was presently dangerous is supported by sufficient evidence.
D.J.W. Violation
COA also rejects P.L.’s second contention that the circuit court failed to make specific factual findings to support the dangerousness standard it relied on as required by D.J.W. (¶20). The circuit court specifically referenced WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20(1)(am) and 51.20(1)(a)2.b., the second dangerousness standard and, pointing to specific testimony, gave reasons why P.L. was dangerous under those standards. COA quotes the circuit court at length, including a specific reference to hearsay within the doctor’s report, as well as thoughts P.L. reported and evidence of drug use. (¶¶20). It concludes that “[t]his is sufficient under a recommitment” because the county need not prove P.L. committed “a recent overt act, attempt or threat to act under par. (a)2.a. or b.” under the recommitment standard. (¶25). However, the court also notes that P.L.’s own testimony supports the dangerousness conclusion, as he stated he does not “think of the words ‘rape’ and ‘kill’ very often anymore.” (¶26).
The court also offers some commentary on the purpose of the recommitment statute, citing the “revolving door” language of Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366, and noting the “explosion of litigation over the standard,” as well as “attacks on circuit court recommitment orders and confusion about whether a County has met its burden of proving dangerousness in a recommitment.” Appellate practitioners can speculate as to COA’s reason for including this commentary. However, while it seems this case had issues due to the lack of contemporaneous objections, the portions of the circuit court’s findings quoted in the opinion do betray a likelihood that the county and court relied heavily on hearsay to prove dangerousness.