COA rejects sufficiency challenges to ch. 51 commitment and medication orders
Fond du Lac County v. K.L.W., , 2026AP87, 7/15/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA concludes that the county presented sufficient evidence to establish “Karrie’s” dangerousness and incompetence to refuse medication. Accordingly, it affirms both orders.
COA acknowledges that the circuit court might not have made sufficient factual findings as to one of the two dangerousness standards it concluded were met, the third standard (sub. 2.c.), but does not resolve that issue, as it concludes that the circuit court made sufficient factual findings as to the second dangerousness standard (sub. 2.b.). (¶20).
Relying on Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶42, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901, COA concludes that testimony from an individual at whom Karrie threw a “Whipper Snapper” firework, swore at, and spoke to in a “strange, demonic fashion” was sufficient to meet the second standard. (¶¶21-23). Thus, COA decides that the circuit court’s factual findings–that the testimony was credible and Karrie’s actions caused the individual reasonable fear of violence and serious harm–were not clearly erroneous.
COA also concludes that the medication order was supported by sufficient evidence. Karrie argues that the doctor’s testimony that she was incompetent to refuse medication was “conclusory and legally insufficient[.]” (¶24). The county asserts that it met its burden, by clear and convincing evidence, to establish that Karrie was incompetent, “as she was incapable of expressing an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to determine whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment.” COA asserts that the circuit court “summarized the detailed testimony of [the doctor]” and concluded that the county met its burden, and quotes the circuit court’s ruling, which essentially parroted the language of the statute. (¶25). However, COA notes that “further review of the Record indicates that [the doctor] advised the circuit court that when he spoke with Karrie on four separate occasions about medication, ‘[s]he continued to be dismissive, paranoid, and facetious, accusatory for giving her medication she doesn’t need.'” (¶26).
The court also briefly addresses the county’s mootness argument related to the medication order.(¶27). It cites S.A.M., but comments that the collateral consequences that defeat mootness “have never been applied to a medication order” and notes that the county did not seek to extend the medication order. Thus, according to the COA, “[i]f there was ever an appeal in which an order was moot, this is clearly it.” Regardless, the court upheld the order on other grounds. (¶28).
Finally, Karrie also argues that the fairness of her final hearing was undermined by a witness sequestration/exclusion issue. Seemingly, Karrie argues on appeal that her trial counsel raised a “concern” regarding the doctor having signed into the Zoom after the court ordered exclusion of witnesses and therefore might have been listening in violation of the court’s order, but does not provide a record citation. (¶¶29-32). COA rejects this argument because of Karrie’s violation of the appellate rules to provide a record citation, and because it is pure speculation. (¶¶32-33).