Defense Win: COA affirms circuit court order suppressing blood test
State of Wisconsin v. Jorge Luis Perez-Aldape, 2026AP642-CR, 7/29/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
In a unique OWI case, COA relies on SCOW guidance to uphold the circuit court’s order suppressing blood evidence due to a failure to read the person the Informing the Accused Form.
Perez-Aldape was involved in a serious accident for which he was not at fault. (¶2). Although there was no indicia of alcohol consumption, Perez-Aldape admitted to having a single drink prior to driving. (¶3). His license was revoked for an OWI and he was subject to a .02 legal limit. (Id.). Again, despite the fact that he was not the person at fault in this accident, Perez-Aldape was cited for operating while revoked, causing great bodily harm. (Id.).
In which the word “causing” is doing a lot of interesting semantic work…
Although the officer conceded he did not have probable cause, the officer nonetheless began filling out “an arrest docket.” (¶4). He then requested a sample of Perez-Aldape’s blood pursuant to then-existing §343.305(3)(ar)2., which authorized law enforcement to request a blood sample if the operator of a vehicle was involved in an accident causing death or great bodily harm and the LEO has “reason to believe” the person violated a traffic law. (¶¶5-6).
As COA notes in a footnote, this (questionably constitutional) provision was subsequently repealed.
The officer conceded he otherwise lacked probable cause to request a blood draw and also failed to read Perez-Aldape the IAF. (Id.). The circuit court therefore granted Perez-Aldape’s motion to suppress the results of that blood draw. (¶10).
On appeal, COA holds that this case is straightforwardly controlled by SCOW’s decision in State v. Blackman, which held that while the standard IAF language did not conform to a situation where blood was requested pursuant to § 343.305(3)(ar)2., the statutory scheme nonetheless compelled that it be read and, therefore, officers were required to “adapt the informing-the accused language to the circumstances at hand.” (¶14). As the IAF was not read at all, COA agrees that the officer failed to comply with the statute and that the resulting blood evidence must be suppressed. (¶15).