Defense win: COA reverses summary judgment on continuing denial of visitation ground and orders summary judgment for parents on same ground
Waupaca County Department of Health & Human Services v. J.L.C. and M.M.C., 2026AP498 and 647, 6/25/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
JLC and MMC each appeal the circuit court order terminating their parental rights to their child, CMC, arguing that the court erred in granting Waupaca County’s motion for summary judgment on grounds. COA concludes that the ground on which SJ was granted, continuing denial of visitation, requires the county to prove that the parents received adequate notice of the conditions of resuming visitation, and the county cannot make this showing under the facts. Therefore, COA reverses the order and remands with directions that the circuit court grant partial summary judgment to both parents on the continuing denial of visitation ground.
CMC was placed with MMC’s mother shortly after birth and then moved to a foster home several months later. In response to the foster parents’ allegation that CMC showed problematic behaviors after visitation with her birth parents, MMC voluntarily suspended visitation. (¶¶3-4). The CHIPS court later entered an order formally suspending visits between CMC and her parents in July 2024. In April 2025, the CHIPS court amended the order. (¶5). The county filed a petition to terminate MMC and JLC’s parental rights in October 2024, alleging continuing CHIPS and failure to assume as grounds for both parents, and also abandonment as to JLC. (¶6).
In July 2025, the county filed an amended petition adding continuing denial of visitation under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) as a ground for termination. The county also moved for summary judgment on that ground on the same day. (¶7). The circuit court granted the county’s motion for partial SJ and later terminated both parents’ rights. (¶9).
Both parents argue that the circuit court erred when it concluded that the county met the continuing denial of visitation ground for termination as a matter of law. The issue before COA is whether the parents had “been denied visitation under an order under [§] 48.345 … containing the notice required by [§] 48.356(2)” and whether “at least one year has elapsed since the order denying … visitation was issued and the court has not subsequently modified its order so as to permit periods of …visitation.” (¶12). The parties agree that the CHIPS court’s July 2024 order gave notice of potential TPR, but the parents argue that the order did not give notice of the conditions necessary for the parents to resume visitation. (¶14).
COA agrees with the parents that they did not receive notice of the conditions to resume visitation, and that this lack of notice requires reversal of the summary judgment “because, even assuming that the July 2024 order and the April 2025 order can be considered together as covering the entire one-year period, these orders failed to give adequate notice of what the parents needed to do to resume visitation.” (¶15). The July 2024 order lists conditions, but “expressly states that the conditions are ‘not limited to’ the specific items listed[.]” (¶17). Thus, it does not specify all of the “conditions necessary” to resume visitation, contrary to § 48.356(2). Further, when the revised order was issued in April 2025, additional conditions were added and the “not limited to” language was removed, further indicating that the July 2024 order was not complete in its list of requirements for resuming visitation.
COA rejects the county’s argument that the broad headings under–which the non-exhaustive lists appeared–were the only “conditions” that were imposed. The items listed below each heading were not mere “examples” but specific conditions the parents had to meet before resuming visitation. COA also provides some analysis on the importance of the notice of such conditions in response to the county’s possible argument that the focus of the continuing denial of visitation ground is the amount of time a parent goes without seeing his or her child, not the conditions. The court concludes that a parent must receive meaningful notice of the conduct that is expected to regain visitation with the child under § 48.356(2).
COA therefore concludes that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the county on the continuing denial of visitation ground. As the county does not argue that there are material factual disputes that would require a jury trial on this ground, and no such disputes are apparent from the record, COA reverses the order terminating the parents’ rights and remands with directions that the parents be granted summary judgment on this ground.