In narrow defense win, SCOTUS invalidates federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by drug users
United States v. Hemani, USSC No. 24-1234, 6/18/2026, affirming a decision of the 5th Circuit, Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
In a unanimous decision, SCOTUS agrees that a federal statute permitting disarmament of persons who are “unlawful users” of controlled substances violates the Second Amendment.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) criminalizes the possession of a firearm by a person who is an “unlawful user of” or “addicted to” a controlled substance. Hemani was prosecuted under this provision after he admitted to being a daily user of marijuana. (Op. p. 3). Applying the Bruen test to this regulation, the government must identify a relevant historical analogy capable of making this restriction “consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” (Op. p. 4). Crucial to that analysis is an exploration of the “why and how” of the regulation: “The more closely a contemporary law mirrors a well-established historical analogue in purpose and operation, the more likely it is to be upheld. Conversely, the more a modern law diverges from traditional laws in purpose and operation, the less likely it is to survive review.” (Op. p. 5).
To meet its burden, the government refers to a collection of regulations targeting what it labels as “habitual drunkards.” (Op. p. 6). The government claims that this establishes a historical tradition of restricting the possession of firearms by “regular users” of intoxicants in order to protect the public from “unusually dangerous” persons who are prone to criminality. (Id.). Closer historical examination, however, finds the government coming up short as these laws “targeted different kinds of people, did so for different purposes, and operated in different ways.” (Op. p. 7). Likewise, the Court is mindful that early American culture was steeped in alcohol consumption, militating against a finding that mere “use” of an intoxicating substance is a sufficient historical basis on which to restrict the Second Amendment right. (Op. p. 9). The Court is also troubled by the lack of any process (under the government’s view, a person who takes a “gummy” as a nighttime sleep aid automatically loses their Second Amendment rights) as well as the sweeping overreach of the law at issue. (Op. p. 15-16). Notably, it also takes issue with the government’s contention that marijuana use is a basis for divestment of Second Amendment liberties, given what it views as the government’s role in “fueling” a pro-legalization and decriminalization push. (Op. p. 17). Accordingly, after repeatedly reminding the reader of the narrowness of its decision, it invalidates this portion of the federal criminal code.
We are operating at a high level of generality in this post given that this is a relatively niche federal issue involving a statute that, as the Court notes, is rarely invoked. However, we find the case interesting as it is yet another point of triangulation for a court trying to chart a course in the rough seas the Bruen floodgates unleashed. Thus, while Rahimi is broadly understood as a softening the strict originalist inquiry mandated by Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Bruen–making clear that the proper inquiry is a search for an analogue, not a historical “twin”–this case is a reminder that this analogical inquiry cannot be conducted with an overly deferential degree of generality. Thus the Court remains skeptical of sweeping, class-based disarmament, even if it reminds readers in a footnote that it is not inviting further litigation on the felon in possession issue it has otherwise succeeding in ducking to date. (Op. p. 15).