SCOW holds criminal courts cannot order involuntary medication of a defendant committed for purposes of competency restoration on basis of dangerousness
State v. N.K.B., 2026 WI 22, 6/26/26, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity
SCOW holds that criminal courts cannot order involuntary medication of a defendant committed for purposes of competency restoration on the basis that he or she is dangerous.
(See our prior posts here and here).
The state charged “Naomi” with battery by prisoner, and her counsel raised competency at an initial appearance. (¶2). At the competency hearing that followed, the circuit court found Naomi incompetent to proceed but likely to regain competency with treatment, and committed Naomi to DHS’s custody. The court also concluded that Naomi was incompetent to refuse medication and that the Sell factors were met, and ordered involuntary medication. Naomi filed a notice of appeal, and the court stayed its involuntary medication order. (¶3).
DHS asked the circuit court to reconsider the stay because Naomi posed a danger to herself or others without medication. (¶3). The court held another hearing, determined that Naomi was dangerous to herself and others, vacated its prior involuntary medication order, and entered a new order for involuntary medication “on grounds of dangerousness.” (¶4). Naomi appealed, arguing that the circuit court did not have legal authority to order that an individual committed only for competency restoration under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 be involuntarily medicated upon a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals agreed with Naomi. (¶5). The state argues that WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes the circuit court’s order.
The court reasons that a circuit court must have statutory authority to order the involuntary medication of a committed individual and § 971.14 does not grant statutory authority for the order at issue. Section 971.14 provides for court-ordered involuntary medication only to restore competency, and not because a defendant is found to be dangerous. Thus, the question is whether the relevant portion of § 51.61(1)(g)3. permits a circuit court to order involuntary medication for an individual committed exclusively under § 971.14. (¶7).
The majority “begin[s] with the the text of § 51.61(1)(g)3.” and cites Meyers v. DNR, 2019 WI 5, ¶18, 385 Wis. 2d 176, 922 N.W.2d 47, for the proposition that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. (¶8). The court then analyzes the text of § 51.61. It holds that while § 51.61(1) includes § 971.14 committees in the definition of “patients” sets forth various rights that “shall” be afforded to “each patient[,]” sub. (1)(g)3. does not apply to individuals committed exclusively under § 971.14 because the statutes must be considered in light of the context provided by related provisions. See Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 72, ¶10, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611.
The context the court references is § 971.14, which contains its own process for a circuit court to determine that an individual committed for competency restoration is not competent to refuse medication. An involuntary medication determination under § 971.14 is subject to the same procedural and substantive requirements as a determination under § 51.61(1)(g)3., but it imposes additional requirements–the Sell factors. (¶9).
Thus, the majority:
conclude[s] that the best way to read § 51.61(1)(g)3. in light of § 971.14’s separate, and more rigorous, process is that § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s first exception does not apply to individuals committed exclusively under § 971.14. After all, there would be no reason to enact a separate process for individuals committed under § 971.14 alone, subject to additional procedural and substantive requirements, if § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s less rigorous process continued to apply to those same individuals. If that were the case, the additional requirements of § 971.14 would essentially be dead letter, since the State could always avoid them by proceeding under § 51.61(1)(g)3. whenever it sought a determination that an individual committed under § 971.14 was not competent to refuse medication. To avoid that outcome, we must read these statutes “dealing with the same matter . . . in harmony such that each has force and effect.” Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶17, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373. In other words, we must conclude that § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize court-ordered involuntary medication for individuals committed exclusively under § 971.14.
(¶10). The court then discusses that this reading of the language of the relevant statutes is “consistent with the statutory history of § 51.61(1) and related statutes, and how we have interpreted that history in the past.” (¶11). Specifically, the majority points out that the legislative history “was essential to our holding in State v. Anthony D.B., [2000 WI 94, ¶8, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435,] a case closely related to this one.” (¶12).
The majority asserts that its conclusion takes into account the text of § 51.61(1)(g)3., full statutory context (including the related provisions of § 971.14), and its statutory history, and is consistent with Anthony D.B.’s conclusion that § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes court-ordered involuntary medication of an individual committed under a chapter listed in § 51.61(1) “unless and until the legislature provides alternative provisions” in the relevant chapter. (¶13). The court also points out a few legal ways in which the state can still forcibly medicate dangerous individuals committed for competency restoration. (¶14). However, because § 51.61(1)(g)3. does not authorize court-ordered involuntary medication of an individual committed exclusively under § 971.14, and Naomi was committed solely under that section, the majority concludes that the order in this case was unlawful. (¶15).
Concurrence
Justice Bradley files a lengthy concurrence containing an impassioned “defense of textualism” and State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. (¶¶16-27). The concurrence contends that the statutory text resolves the case and the analysis should stop there. It also claims that the majority’s omission of Kalal is intentional. Next, providing the full language of the relevant statutes across several footnotes, the concurrence conducts a textual analysis and comes to the same conclusion as the majority. Finally, the concurrence considers the liberty interests at play and concludes that the state’s proposed interpretation would compromise liberty and undermine ch. 51’s safeguards.
Dissent
Justice Ziegler dissents, as she “would not hamstring the criminal court judge from considering the dangerousness of the defendant who needs treatment,” nor “require a separate chapter 51 proceeding.” (¶¶54-55). The dissent conducts a textual analysis, citing Kalal, and concludes that “[c]itizens reading this statute would understand that the statute authorizes courts committing a defendant for competency under WIS. STAT. § 971.14 to order involuntary medication to address a defendant’s dangerousness at an institution.” (¶¶58, 63-77). It also concludes that authorizing an involuntary medication order for dangerousness harmonizes the two statutes, and is consistent with legislative intent and practical considerations. (¶¶77-78).