Seventh Circuit denies habeas petition from Wisconsin defendant because undisclosed exculpatory evidence was cumulative to evidence provided to trial counsel.
Jeffrey Hineman v. Daisy Chase, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-2000, 7/20/26
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Eastern District of Wisconsin’s order granting a petition for habeas corpus after the petitioner was convicted of first-degree sexual assault in Racine County. The Court held that SCOW’s decision that evidence favorable to the petitioner and not disclosed by the State was cumulative to evidence that was available to trial counsel was not contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by SCOTUS.
A therapist reported to Racine County Child Protective Services (CPS) in March 2015 that six-year old SJS showed behavioral and anger issues at home and school, pulled his pants down in class, acted as if he was going to defecate on the floor, simulated oral sex with a pen, and told classmates that “it feels good when someone sucks on your privates.” SJS said he initially learned about these matters from a Garfield movie, but later told his father that Jeffrey Hineman told him. Hineman was SJS’s mother’s ex-boyfriend, who maintained contact with SJS after they broke up. However, the CPS report stated that SJS did not allege that Hineman touched him or forced him to touch Hineman. (Slip op. at 3).
An investigator for the sheriff’s office reviewed the CPS report and summarized its contents in her police report in June 2015, including that SJS did not allege Hineman sexually abused him. A forensic interviewer met with SJS in August 2015; SJS told her that Hineman touched him inappropriately. (Slip op. at 4).
Hineman was charged with first-degree child sexual assault and the State disclosed to Hineman the investigator’s report describing the CPS report, but not the CPS report itself. The forensic interviewer, SJS, SJS’s grandmother, and the investigator testified at Hineman’s trial and SJS’s forensic interview was played for the jury. The investigator testified that she did not know whether SJS’s forensic interview was the first time he alleged Hineman touched him and she believed it was in the CPS report. Defense counsel did not impeach the investigator with her report summarizing the CPS report, which stated that SJS did not accuse Hineman of touching him. Hineman was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison. (Slip op. 4-8).
Hineman filed a postconviction motion asking for a new trial because the State suppressed favorable material evidence by not disclosing the CPS report, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The circuit court denied the motion, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Hineman filed a federal habeas petition, which was granted by the district court. The State appealed to the Seventh Circuit and argued the state court decision was not contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. (Slip op. 8-9).
The Supreme Court’s clearly established federal law at issue was Brady’s holding that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose favorable evidence upon a defendant’s request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. (Slip op. at 11). SCOW determined that the CPS report was favorable and suppressed, but not material. The Seventh Circuit found that SCOW’s decision did not unreasonably apply Brady and its progeny.
The Seventh Circuit noted that evidence is material under Brady if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Slip op. at 11). SCOW evaluated the CPS report alongside the investigator’s report containing “nearly identical language” and concluded the CPS report was cumulative impeachment evidence with no substantial likelihood of changing the outcome of the trial, which the Seventh Circuit considered a reasonable application of Brady. (Slip op. at 12).
Hineman argued that the CPS report would have demonstrated that SJS delayed disclosing his allegation from March to August, but the Court found this information cumulative to the investigator’s police report, which was provided to defense counsel and counsel did not use to impeach the investigator: “If Hineman’s inability to impeach [the investigator’s] testimony dating SJS’s initial disclosure to March deprived him of a fair trial, it was because his counsel failed to use the police report to that end, not because the State suppressed the report. And Hineman does not claim ineffective assistance of counsel on those grounds.” (Slip op. at 13).
The Seventh Circuit also rejected Hineman’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the CPS report because Brady’s materiality standard is the same standard to assess prejudice if counsel’s performance was deficient: “As with the Brady materiality analysis, it is reasonable to conclude the result would not have changed had Hineman’s attorney obtained the CPS report, since even when she had the police report containing identical information at her disposal, she did not use it to impeach [the investigator’s] testimony regarding SJS’s disclosure.” (Slip op. at 18).