COA affirms denial of motion to suppress extension of stop and PBT results
State v. Paula Andrea Champion, 2025AP802, 8/18/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA affirms circuit court’s denial of Paula Champion’s motion to suppress in appeal of PAC 1st judgment.
Champion called 911 for assistance after she hit an object on the highway. Law enforcement officers arrived to find Champion in her car, stopped partially in an exit lane of the highway. (¶2). Officers smelled alcohol and saw that Champion’s eyes were red and glossy, so they conducted FSTs with an additional officer acting as an interpreter. (¶¶3-4). Champion told the interpreter that she’d had one glass of wine. She completed 3 FSTs, showing some clues of impairment, but also seemingly struggling with the instructions. (¶¶4-7). Champion submitted to a PBT and was then arrested and issued a PAC citation. (¶8).
Champion moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers unreasonably extended the traffic stop to conduct the FSTs and lacked probable cause to arrest her. (¶9). The circuit court denied the motion and found Champion guilty of PAC 1st offense after a court trial. (¶10). On appeal, Champion argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the extension of the investigatory stop and the officers’ request that she take a PBT constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. (¶11).
First, Champion argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and conduct FSTs. COA concludes that multiple facts–her car was immobilized in a highway exit lane, officers smelled alcohol coming from her and saw that she had red, glossy eyes, and she reported having hit something while driving on the highway–, considered together, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Champion was operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration. (¶15).
COA distinguishes State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394, which held that additional, separate facts are required to warrant a detention for FSTs because they are a greater invasion of liberty than an initial police stop. Here, officers did not stop Champion for a different violation because she “summoned” law enforcement, so there was no initial stop. (¶¶18-19). Thus, they did not need separate or distinct facts to establish reasonable suspicion for the PAC investigation.
Second, Champion argues that officers lacked probable cause to request that she take a PBT because the interpreter did not translate some of the instructions for the FSTs. (¶20). COA analyzes specific tests and clues clues, whether the instructions were translated, and whether the officer counted those clues. (¶¶24-25). As probable cause to administer a PBT can still be present when FSTs yield inconclusive results, the court concludes that the officers here had the required degree of probable cause to do so. Specifically, COA concludes that “[i]t is believable that Champion’s confusion during the FSTs was due to translation issues and also that it could have come from intoxication” and the circuit court found that Champion “was not able to take instructions clearly” even when the instructions were translated for her. Thus, the officers had the required degree of probable cause, even disregarding the clues impacted by imperfect translation. (¶28).