Defense wins: COA finds defendant exercising his right avoid contact with law enforcement did not provide reasonable suspicion for investigatory detention.
State v. Derek A. Lamb, 2025AP824, 7/31/26, District IV (not recommened for publication); case activity
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of a traffic stop where the only evidence of criminal activity was that the defendant was parked next to another vehicle on a dead-end road at 3 a.m. and the defendant attempted to avoid contact with law enforcement.
A Portage County deputy sheriff was on patrol at 3 a.m. in the Town of Grant, a community with an approximate population of 2,000. The deputy followed a blue vehicle until it parked at a dead-end road, although he did not observe a traffic violation or suspicious behavior. The blue vehicle was parked behind Derek Lamb’s vehicle; both vehicles were facing the deputy and occupied. The deputy shined his squad car’s spotlight into Lamb’s vehicle and Lamb drove forward toward the squad car. The deputy positioned the squad car to block Lamb’s vehicle and activated his emergency lights. Lamb briefly drove in reverse, stopped, and exited the vehicle. The deputy eventually seized methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia and Lamb was charged with possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possessing drug paraphernalia. (¶¶ 2-7).
Lamb asked the circuit court to suppress the fruits of the traffic stop because he was stopped without reasonable suspicion. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the motion because it found the time of day, remote location for two vehicles to be parked together, and Lamb’s attempt to avoid contact with the deputy provided reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. (¶ 10).
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order denying Lamb’s motion to suppress because the facts were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (¶ 18). The COA noted that the deputy did not observe the driver of the blue vehicle violate a traffic law or engage in suspicious activity, and it did not consider significant that two vehicles were parked near each other at 3 a.m. on a dark, dead-end road because the conduct itself was not illegal. (¶ 20). The COA observed that there was no evidence the vehicles were parked in a “high-crime area,” the deputy did not observe the occupants of the vehicles interact, and neither occupant engaged in furtive movements. (¶¶ 22-23).
With respect to Lamb’s attempt to avoid contact with the deputy, the COA recognized that an “essential tenet” of the Fourth Amendment is that a person has a right to ignore law enforcement and go about his business when law enforcement does not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to approach the person. (¶ 26). The COA distinguished “going about one’s business,” which should not be considered in the reasonable suspicion calculus; and “flight,” which is a proper factor to evaluate reasonable suspicion. The COA found that Lamb’s attempt to drive away was within his right to go about his business because he did not quickly accelerate from a parked position or drive at a high speed to pass the deputy’s squad car: “that Lamb exercised his right to not engage with law enforcement does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.” (¶ 28).
But even if the conduct could be considered “flight,” the COA determined it would not change the outcome because flight does not automatically establish reasonable suspicion and Lamb’s attempt to pull his vehicle forward did not “tip the balance” in favor of reasonable suspicion:
[T]he facts known to the deputy at the time of the seizure – namely, that there were two occupied vehicles parked near each other on a dark, dead-end road at 3:00 a.m. and one vehicle attempted to leave in response to the deputy’s approach – do not constitute articulable facts sufficient to support reasonable suspicion that Lamb “had engaged in criminal activity, was currently doing so or was about to do so.”
(¶ 31).