COA rejects challenge to exercise of discretion at TPR disposition hearing
State v. Y.M., 2026AP1212, 8/27/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity
“Yolanda” challenges the circuit court’s exercise of discretion at disposition, arguing that the evidence lacked “complete and meaningful testimony” from the children’s foster placements and potential adoptive parents. COA rejects these arguments and affirms.
The Division of Milwaukee Child Welfare took temporary physical custody of Yolanda’s three children, “Miriam,” “Zeke,” and “Yara” after receiving a report about her drinking and finding Yolanda to be intoxicated when a worker went to her home. (¶¶2-3). The circuit court then entered CHIPS orders in October 2023, and also ordered the children’s placements be undisclosed because while Yolanda had previously taken two of the children from their foster placement. (¶4). The children’s locations remained undisclosed on that basis and because of possible threats of violence from Yolanda reported by a family member. (¶¶7-8).
The state filed petitions to terminate Yolanda’s parental rights in May 2024. (¶5). A jury later found that the state established three grounds for termination. (¶9). The children’s ongoing case manager testified about each child at the disposition hearing. (¶¶13-15). Due to the continuing safety and confidentiality concerns, Miriam’s foster parent testified by Zoom with her camera off and using a pseudonym. (¶¶10-11, 16). After additional testimony from the case manager, the circuit court made findings and considered the WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3) best interest factors. (¶¶18-19).
On appeal, Yolanda argues that the circuit court’s findings were defective because Miriam’s foster parent was allowed to testify anonymously, and Zeke and Yara’s foster parents did not testify at disposition. “In essence, Yolanda argues that without such testimony, a circuit court cannot make a legally supportable determination of the best interests of the child, and any attempt to assess the factors under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3) will be deficient.” (¶20). However, the statute places no burden of proof on any particular party. (¶22).
Yolanda specifically challenges the circuit court’s ability to properly exercise its discretion as it relates to two specific factors: (a) “[t]he likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination”; and (f) “[w]hether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of the termination” because the record lacked testimony or other evidence directly from the placements of all three children addressing those factors. (¶23). Yolanda’s counsel objected to the undisclosed nature of the placements, the circuit court’s order prohibiting her counsel from discussing identifying information of the placements with her, and the lack of evidence regarding the placements presented at disposition, and argued that these matters were fundamentally unfair to Yolanda, he was unable to properly prepare for disposition, and the court was unable to properly exercise its discretion as to the children’s best interests. (¶25).
COA is unpersuaded that the evidence was necessary for the circuit court to properly exercise its discretion as to the best interests of the children. (¶26). It concludes that there was sufficient testimonial evidence from the OCM, as well as Miriam’s placement, to allow the circuit court to properly exercise its discretion in determining whether Yolanda’s parental rights should be terminated. It therefore further concludes that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it terminated Yolanda’s parental rights. (¶27). Essentially, because the circuit court referenced the correct legal standard and each individual factor, and is not required to hear from specific witnesses, COA affirms. (¶¶28-33).