SCOW to decide whether criminal defendants must be competent to assist attorney on appeal of order finding defendant competent to stand trial; whether to overrule Meeks
State v. Shane M. Helmbrecht, 2024AP1850, petition for review of a per curiam opinion of the court of appeals, granted 10/14/26; case activity
SCOW will decide whether it is appropriate to order postdisposition competency evaluations in cases on appeal from determinations on competence to stand trial.
In a per curiam opinion, COA held that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Helmbrecht’s motion for a postdisposition competency evaluation. This case began in 2016, when the state charged Helmbrecht with one count of first-degree intentional homicide. After multiple rounds of competency proceedings, including several findings that Helmbrecht was incompetent and unlikely to regain competency in the statutory timeframe, the circuit court ordered that Helmbrecht be held at Mendota Mental Health Institute. In 2022, the state filed a motion for another competency evaluation. Helmbrecht absconded to Mexico, was extradited to Wisconsin and was ultimately found to be competent to stand trial in September 2024. He filed a notice of intent to appeal that order.
Helmbrecht’s appellate counsel then raised postdisposition competency, averring he had “reason to doubt Mr. Helmbrecht’s ability to make postdisposition decisions with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Counsel did not disclose why he doubted Helmbrecht’s competence, claiming he could not do so without Helmbrecht’s consent or an order from the circuit court. Counsel argued that the court should not deny the motion without first ordering him to provide the reasons he raised competency. The court ruled that it needed to have a reason to order a competency evaluation and it denied the motion for a postdisposition competency evaluation. Helmbrecht appealed.
The court of appeals assumed without deciding that a defendant must be competent to appeal a pretrial order determining their competency to stand trial. However, it concluded that counsel must present evidence to the circuit court regarding a client’s incompetency and that Helmbrecht had forfeited the issue that the circuit court had not ordered counsel to disclose the reasons. Thus, COA held that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Helmbrecht’s postdisposition competency evaluation.
SCOW accepts Helmbrecht’s petition for review to consider the following issues:
1. Must defense attorneys seek permission to violate their duty of confidentiality to secure a competency evaluation for their client?
2. Does a criminal defendant need to be competent to assist their attorney from an appeal of an order related to their competency to proceed to trial?
3. Did the circuit court properly deny appellate counsel’s motion for a postdisposition competency evaluation?
The order granting Helmbrecht’s petition adds another issue: Whether State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 829, should be overruled or modified.
Helmbrecht’s petition outlines the Meeks issue as follows:
Underlying the issue is the tension between State v. Meeks, which cautioned against unnecessary disclosure of an attorneys “opinions, perceptions, or impressions that form the basis for his or her reason to doubt the client[‘]s competence,” 263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶46, and the holding that “there must be some evidence raising doubt” as to competency before courts are required to have a defendant evaluated. State v. McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d 582, 595, 223 N.W.2d 550 (1974); see also State v. Weber, 146 Wis. 2d 817, 823, 433 N.W.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1988). Because ordering a competency evaluation is discretionary, Weber, 146 Wis. 2d at 823, and attorneys are cautioned to reveal as little information as possible, this issue is likely to recur.
In its response to Helmbrecht’s petition, the state argues that the supreme court should overrule Meeks as it “was wrongly decided in the first instance and changes in the confidentiality rule and
cases clarifying what is and is not protected by the attorney client privilege have made it ‘ripe for reexamination.'”