COA affirms denial of motion to suppress search of individual based on K9’s alert to driver’s car door
State v. Alan Joseph Lecher, 2026AP90-CR, 10/7/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA affirms circuit court’s denial of Lecher’s motion to suppress law enforcement’s discovery of alprazolam tablets after a warrantless search, concluding that probable cause existed to search Lecher’s person.
Police officers pulled Lecher over a few minutes after he left a known drug house where he had stayed the previous night. (¶2). While an officer was filling out paperwork, an investigator came “with his trained and certified odor-detecting K9, Mika.” (¶3). The K9 “specifically indicated to the driver’s door” of the car, so the officers searched but did not find anything in the car. The officer then searched Lecher and found, in his front chest pocket, an unmarked prescription bottle with two, 2 mg alprazolam pills. (¶3).
The state charged Lecher with possessing an illegally obtained prescription and Lecher filed a suppression motion alleging the officer unlawfully searched his person. (¶4). At the suppression hearing, the officer who conducted the search testified that “when drugs are not discovered pursuant to a vehicle search despite a K9 having alerted to the vehicle, it is very common for an individual who has exited the vehicle during the K9 search to have drugs on their person instead.” (¶3).
COA concludes that “[w]hether probable cause existed to search Lecher’s person is a close call” but, ultimately, it was reasonable to believe Lecher had drugs on his person under the totality of the circumstances.
The objective facts are as follows. Lecher spent the night at a known drug house and the police observed him leave that house, get into a vehicle nearby, and drive away. The stop occurred shortly after driving away from a known drug house, without Lecher having made any intervening stops, and without anyone being seen coming or going from the vehicle. During a valid traffic stop, K9 Mika indicated to the driver’s door, the same door next to where Lecher, who was the vehicle’s sole occupant, had just been sitting in and that Lecher used to exit the vehicle moments prior. Based on her prior experience, Officer Saeger, who conducted the search, knew that drivers commonly put drugs on themselves in order to conceal the drugs before exiting a vehicle for a K9 search. Specifically, Officer Saeger had 13 years of experience with K9s and narcotics, was a part of the drug investigation unit, was trained in identifying drug activity, and had personally been a part of thousands of drug investigations over her career.
(¶10).
This case touches on two additional issues, which COA does not directly address. First, the circuit court decided the suppression motion on whether the officers had reasonable suspicion, as Lecher qualified as an Act 79 probationer. It concluded that the application of Act 79 is an objective test, so the officers’ subjective knowledge (i.e., no knowledge of Lecher’s Act 79 status) at the time of the search was not relevant. (¶4). Lecher filed a motion seeking to convert this one-judge appeal to a three-judge panel to address whether Act 79 required the police officer to know he was subject to Act 79 before conducting the search. (¶8 n.7). However, as COA concludes that the officers had probable cause to search Lecher’s person, it did not decide the Act 79 issue.
Second, COA notes that the K9 had not been trained to detect alprazolam. However, “the officer testified that, based on her experience, drug dogs are likely to indicate to a street drug (i.e., marijuana, methamphetamine, or heroin) that an individual is abusing rather than to a prescription drug the individual may also be abusing.” (¶3 n.3). The court then assumes the K9 “may have smelled a street-drug-induced manipulation on the driver-side door rather than alprazolam, a prescription drug she was not trained to detect.”