COA holds that circuit court did not erroneously exercise discretion in refusing to reopen forfeiture case
Village of Whitefish Bay v. Ross Bolingbroke, 2025AP2547-52, 10/15/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA affirms the court’s ruling that Bolingbroke’s audio-only Zoom appearance merited a default judgment and determines that medical evidence provided by Bolingbroke did not justify reopening the matter after a second missed court date.
Note: This opinion was originally issued last week and then withdrawn. We are posting on the reissued version.
Bolingbroke was issued a medley of citations, some for traffic violations and one for a non-criminal ordinance violations (resisting or obstructing an officer). (¶2). Bolingbroke received permission to attend a pretrial conference via Zoom. (¶3). However, he attempted to appear by audio only. (Id.). Because he failed to appear “in the manner prescribed by the court” this was “deemed a non-appearance and the court ordered the entry of a no-contest plea and default judgment.” (Id.).
Bolingbroke filed a motion to reopen. (¶4). However, he failed to appear at the subsequent motion hearing after faxing the court a letter explaining that he was suffering from medical issues. (Id.). The motion was denied. (Id.). Bolingbroke then filed another motion to reopen and submitted additional medical records to substantiate his claim that he was unable to appear at the prior motion hearing. (¶5). After a hearing, the motion was again denied. (¶7).
On appeal, because of the nature of Bolingbroke’s citations, two different reopening provisions are at issue: § 806.07 and § 345.51. (¶12). Both statutes contain an “excusable neglect” standard, which is defined as “‘that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances’ and ‘is not synonymous with carelessness or inattentiveness.'” (¶14). The decision to reopen is a discretionary decision for the circuit court. (¶15). While COA somewhat chastises the circuit court for failing to cite the legal standard in its oral ruling, a search of the record finds grounds for affirmance. (¶16).
As to the Zoom appearance, “Zoom is commonly understood to be a video-conferencing platform, therefore Bolingbroke’s expectation to appear by audio only was not the expectation of a ‘reasonably prudent’ person.” (¶17). Bolingbroke has also failed to include a transcript of that hearing, so COA assumes that it supports the circuit court’s ruling. (Id.).
As to his second missed appearance, COA agrees with the circuit court that the documentation as to the medical issue is somewhat “unconvincing” and does not “show that Bolingbroke was unable to attend court in-person that day, or, at the very least, to call the court and request to appear remotely.” (¶21). COA holds that a reasonably prudent person would have done more under the circumstances. (Id.)
The case demonstrates the broad discretion allocated to circuit courts in entertaining a motion to reopen and the high burden that litigants must meet to overcome default in these circumstances. It is also a worthy cautionary tale for all litigants involved in Zoom matters, as the case supports the view that a failure to turn the camera on–even if the person is present via audio–can justifiably be used as a nonappearance and carry significant consequences.