COA rejects attempt to distinguish SCOW precedent and finds dangerousness in Ch. 51
Washington County v. P.B.T.,, 2026AP1230, 9/23/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Although P.B.T. tries to argue that the plain text of the statute precluded a finding of dangerousness, COA finds his argument foreclosed by existing precedent interpreting that statute and affirms.
“Pat’s” mental commitment stems from an incident where he drove his car into a bank and exhibited disordered thinking when police arrived to investigate. (¶¶3-4). He was then found dangerous under third standard, which requires that a person’s impaired judgment be demonstrated by a “pattern of recent acts or omissions.” (¶22). Pat argues that as there was only one incident, the accident in the bank parking lot, the County failed to prove the requisite “pattern.” (¶23). He further argues that the circuit court improperly used his mental beliefs (his paranoia) as an “act” helping to establish the requisite pattern. (Id.).
COA rejects Pat’s reading of the statute under its reading of Outagamie County v. Michael H. (¶24).In its view, Michael H. establishes that “verbal statements” can be “acts” for the purpose of identifying the required “pattern.” (¶24). There, a case involving threats of self-harm, SCOW relied on a number of statements and assertions made by Michael to find that dangerousness had been proven. (Id.). While COA acknowledges that SCOW’s holding is also driven by the “deferential review of jury verdicts” it ultimately holds that the rule applies here as well. (¶25). Thus:
Peter’s acts of September 26, 2025—driving into a building instead of stopping in a parking space, going over multiple curbs, and comments to the officer—began the “pattern of recent acts” “[e]videnc[ing] such impaired judgment … that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself … or other individuals.” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. His October 4th interview with Bales further demonstrated his impaired judgment to the extent of that substantial probability. Finally, as the circuit court found, Peter’s verbalizations during his own testimony at the final hearing concluded the 15-day-long “pattern of recent acts.”
(¶28).