COA rejects multiple challenges to appointment of guardian for child
Monroe County v. T.L.B., 2025AP2519, 9/24/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
T.L.B. appeals an order appointing a guardian of the person for her minor child, G.L.W., under WIS. STAT. § 48.977. She makes numerous arguments, including that the circuit court applied the incorrect legal standard and that its conclusions were erroneous. COA affirms.
G.L.W. was removed from the parents’ care while still at the hospital after birth. Shortly afterward, T.L.B. suffered a stroke. G.L.W. was placed with an aunt and uncle after the circuit court entered a CHIPS dispositional order and has remained with them since then. (¶¶2-3). T.L.B. is an enrolled member of the Ho-Chunk Nation, therefore ICWA applies to custody proceedings involving G.L.W. (¶4).
About 3 years later, the county filed a petition to appoint the aunt and uncle as G.L.W.’s joint guardians. (¶5). The circuit court held a trial to determine if the conditions required for appointing a guardian were present. The county called several “parent coaches” employed by private service providers and two county social workers. The parents also testified. (¶6). The court found that the necessary conditions were met and later held a dispositional hearing, ultimately appointing the aunt and uncle as guardians for G.L.W. (¶7).
On appeal, T.L.B. argues that the circuit court applied the incorrect legal standards and erred in concluding: (1) that she and her spouse were unable to parent G.L.W.; (2) that the Monroe County Department of Human Services undertook reasonable efforts to reunite G.L.W. with the parents; and (3) that future efforts to reunite G.L.W. with the parents were not likely to be successful.
COA frames the issues here in the context of two of the WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2) conditions–whether both of G.L.W.’s parents were “unable to carry out the duties of a guardian” pursuant to sub. (2)(e), and whether the County “made reasonable efforts to make it possible for [G.L.W.] to return” to the parents’ residence, whether it was likely that G.L.W. would be reunited with his parents, and whether further reunification efforts would be in G.L.W.’s best interest under sub. (2)(f). (¶¶12-13).
As to T.L.B.’s first argument, she claims that the circuit court failed to properly apply pertinent legal standards in Barstad v. Frazier. T.L.B. contends that the court failed to apply the principle that “a parent is entitled to custody of his or her children unless the parent is either unfit or unable to care for the children or there are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a third party.” However, COA notes that T.L.B. does not develop an argument explaining how the Barstad principle “differs in any meaningful way from” the sub. (2)(e) standard that the parents must be unable to carry out the duties of a guardian. (¶15).
T.L.B. also contends that there was no “compelling reason” and the circuit court’s conclusion was essentially that there were others available who could do a better job meeting G.L.W.’s needs. (¶15). COA rejects this argument too, pointing out the various ways the court found that the parents could not meet G.L.W.’s needs in light of the statutory definition of duties of a guardian. (¶¶17-19).
COA considers essentially the same issues as to T.L.B.’s arguments related to the § 48.977(2)(e) inability to parent requirement, and comes to the same conclusion. (¶¶20-28). The county met its burden of proof, and the circuit court did not err in concluding that the condition had been met. (¶28).
As to § 48.977(2)(f), reasonable efforts and likelihood of reunification, COA discusses the statutory requirement in detail, as well as the specific facts of the case. (¶¶29-30). Here, the count’s efforts included attempting to find effective ways to communicate with the parents and sharing relevant information, which COA agrees was “above and beyond” what it “might normally do” for parents. (¶¶31-32). The county also tried to help the parents improve the safety and appropriateness of their home, which the parents rejected. (¶¶33-35).
T.L.B. also “apparently” challenges the application of (2)(f), on the issue of whether reunification was likely, as the circuit court considered the bond that existed between G.L.W. and the parents as evidence that future efforts at reunification were not likely to succeed. T.L.B. argues that the consideration therefore created a self-fulfilling argument in favor of a guardianship: “the County limited T.L.B.’s contact with G.L.W., which contributed to a weaker bond, which allowed the County to cite the weaker bond as a reason to permanently place G.L.W. outside the parents’ residence.” (¶36). COA rejects this argument because it is unsupported by legal authority or evidence from the record. (¶37). COA also rejects T.L.B.’s argument that reunification was achievable with adaptive services to fit her specific needs because she does not offer a detailed explanation supported by evidence in the record at trial explaining the services and how they differed from what the county offered. (¶38).
Finally, COA critiques T.L.B.’s arguments on the basis that she seems to apply the “active efforts” requirement from the Wisconsin version of ICWA. COA concludes that the ICWA requirements do not apply because the child was already removed from the parents and placed outside the home. (¶39).
COA therefore affirms the circuit court’s appointment of guardians for G.L.W.