In decision recommended for publication, COA holds that investigating criminal record of a passenger is part of traffic stop “mission”
State v. Erik Howard Pantle, 2025AP2003-CR, 10/14/26, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
In a decision recommended for publication, COA reiterates that a dog sniff is not a search and that police do not unreasonably prolong a traffic stop by running a record check on the passengers in the car.
Police “pulled over Pantle’s jeep because it had expired license plates and Pantle, the registered owner, had a suspended driver’s license.” (¶3). Pantle was immediately identified as the driver. (Id.). There were two passengers. (Id.). Although one of the passengers responded to the officer’s request to identify herself by providing her name, the other did not. (Id.). Consistent with what he explained as his usual practice, the officer wanted to check the criminal record of the passenger to see whether she had warrants, a violent past, was known to carry a weapon, or was possibly suicidal. (¶4). He justified this explanation under the guise of “officer safety.” (Id.).
When the officer went to his car to check Pantle and the passenger’s criminal records, he almost immediately called dispatch to request additional officers as a “safety precaution” because a K9 officer, already onsite, was intending to conduct a dog sniff. (¶5). The request for multiple additional officers during this otherwise routine traffic stop was once again justified with reference to “officer safety.” (¶6). It took six minutes for a third officer to arrive onsite (in addition to the K9 officer and the officer running the record check). (¶7). The timing worked out perfectly: a dog sniff occurred just as the citing officer “almost completed” the traffic citation. (¶7). The sniff was positive and an ensuing search revealed illicit drugs inside the car. (¶8). Citing Rodriguez, the circuit court found that the additional search of the passenger’s criminal background was a deviation from the traffic stop mission and unlawfully extended the stop. (¶12).
COA reverses. It begins by clarifying that while the constitutionality of a traffic stop is ordinarily assessed with reference to the constitutional rights of the citizen subject to intrusive state action, that analysis also needs to acknowledge the inherent dangerousness of these stops for the armed agents of the State initiating them. (¶14). It is therefore publishing this (we assume) case “to clarify some of the many rules and restrictions law enforcement faces during a traffic stop of a vehicle while still being cognizant that the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that “[t]raffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers[.]’” (Id.).
After first clarifying that dog sniffs are not searches for the purposes of the constitution, (¶18), it moves to the “mission” inquiry central to this appeal. The general rule is that while law enforcement is required to diligently execute the “mission” of the traffic stop, it is also not precluded from certain “additional activities” that don’t lengthen the stop. (¶22). Citing the Seventh Circuit, COA holds that officer safety is one consideration requiring attention in this analysis. (¶21).
COA goes on to hold that existing Wisconsin case law already grants police the authority to “conduct record checks of passengers during a traffic stop.” (¶23). In support, it cites State v. Griffith and State v. Gammons. (¶23). It also relies on State v. Salonen for the proposition that passengers pose a risk to officers and, therefore, there’s a valid officer safety justification to check their records. (¶23). “Accordingly, we agree that a record check of passengers during a traffic stop is a part of the stop’s mission because it is ‘normally reasonable, as it takes little time and may reveal outstanding arrest warrants.'” (¶25). Such an action is “negligibly burdensome” and furthers officer safety considerations. (Id.). However, even though such a record check is now part of the traffic stop “mission,” COA states that it is conceivable that, in some cases, such actions may still unreasonably extend the stop. (¶26).
Accordingly, because the dog sniff occurred while the officer was pursuing the traffic stop mission, there was no constitutional violation. (¶30).
There’s a lot to be said about this opinion, which expands the scope of traffic stops by permitting law enforcement officers to conduct record searches of passengers who are merely present in a car where someone else is committing a non-criminal traffic violation.
To begin, the decision is clearly intended to restore what District II feels to be an analytical balance to the Fourth Amendment inquiry by focusing on the difficult task faced by police who must find a way to protect themselves while also being hemmed in by the “many rules and restrictions” imposed by judicial actors. And. as further evidence of its pro-police slant, look no further than its decision to grant the officers involved in this traffic stop pseudonyms. Thus, while one might think that citizens have some right to know about the actions of public servants entrusted with the discretionary use of coercive state violence, here, COA decides that these officers need to be shielded from public scrutiny. With its focus on “officer safety,” it therefore grants officers a new way to expand the scope of a traffic stop. Or, as Pantle argued here, it has supplied officers with yet another “pretext” that can be employed to neutralize the force of SCOTUS’s decision in Rodriguez.
Now that we’ve interrogated the ideological goals apparently motivating this decision, its worth taking a look at COA’s citations. Here, COA claims that the authority to conduct passenger record checks is already well-settled. But the cases it cites don’t support that proposition. First, Griffith says nothing about record checks. Instead, it merely concerns whether, under the facts of that case, a police officer unreasonably extended a stop by asking a passenger for his name. Gammons, meanwhile, did not independently analyze the question; instead it cited Griffith for the proposition that an officer can ask a passenger to identify himself and run a check without also recognizing that, in fact, no such “check” was discussed in Griffith. Finally, Salonen involves the question of whether a passenger can be asked to remain on scene during a traffic stop; the issue presented in this case is not straightforwardly analyzed.
Of course, COA is able to cite many persuasive federal authorities in support of its reading. But, of course, those federal authorities are not binding. Accordingly, Pantle has a compelling PFR to say the very least.