COA: Driver not subject to .02 PAC if one of the qualifying events is license revocation for refusing to submit to blood test and recommends publication.
State v. Michael R. Rossow, 2025AP560, 11/10/26, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
The COA recommended publishing its decision that a driver cannot be subject to a prohibited alcohol concentration of 0.02 if one of the three qualifying events is a driver’s license revocation based on the driver refusing to submit to a blood draw.
Among five counts related to his arrest for operating while intoxicated, Michael Rossow was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a PAC of more than 0.02 as a third offense. The State alleged that Rossow’s PAC was 0.02, and not the standard 0.08, because he had two prior OWI convictions and his driver’s license was revoked after he refused to submit to a warrantless blood draw. Section 340.01(46m)(c) prohibits a person with three or more prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations from driving with an alcohol concentration greater than 0.02. The circuit court granted Rossow’s motion to dismiss the count for driving with a prohibited PAC because SCOW’s decision in Forrett precluded counting Rossow’s revocation for refusing a blood draw as one of the three or more convictions, suspensions, or revocations to determine the applicable PAC level. (¶¶ 5-7).
The State appealed and argued that it complied with Forrett by charging Rossow with operating with a PAC as a third offense, not a fourth offense, and therefore it did not elevate or enhance his criminal charges or penalties based on his prior revocation for refusing a blood draw.
SCOW recognized in Dalton that a person has a constitutional right to refuse a warrantless blood draw and held that criminal punishment for exercising this right is impermissible. (¶ 11). Forrett held that a driver’s license revocation for refusing to submit to a blood draw cannot be used to enhance a penalty under Wisconsin’s graduated scheme for OWI offenses based on the person’s prior convictions, suspensions, and revocations. (¶ 12). The COA noted Forrett’s admonition that the State cannot impose a penalty on a person because the person exercised his or her Fourth Amendment right, “no matter the form the criminal penalty takes.” (¶ 12).
The COA held that “counting prior revocations resulting solely from a refusal to submit to a warrantless blood draw to lower the PAC threshold . . . runs afoul of Forrett” because the result is “that it either creates criminal liability and/or increases criminal penalties where the penalties either previously did not exist or were less severe.” (¶ 17). The COA considered that Forrett was “written broadly to encompass any increased criminal penalties resulting solely from a person’s refusal to submit to a warrantless blood draw.” (¶ 20).
The COA distinguished its decision in Sparby-Duncan, where it upheld the defendant’s convictions for driving without an ignition interlock device (IID) and for operating with a PAC above 0.02 because the charges were sufficiently attenuated from the refusal; the IID requirement was imposed as a civil penalty for refusing a blood draw and the .02 PAC was in effect because the driver was required to install the IID. Here, by contrast, “there are no facts or circumstances that separate Rossow’s refusal to submit to the warrantless blood draw in 2011 from the imposition of the 0.02 PAC in this case,” which “was imposed as a direct result of Mr. Rossow’s prior conviction for unlawfully refusing to submit to an implied consent test and not because he was in violation of an IID requirement.” (¶ 18).