COA holds circuit court may take judicial notice of prior conviction to satisfy § 939.62(2m)(b)2. persistent repeater status

State v. Dennis D. Banks, 2025AP597-CR, 11/5/26, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity

COA affirms Banks’s first-degree sexual assault of a child conviction with WIS. STAT. § 939.62(2m)(c) persistent repeater enhancer, rejecting Banks’s arguments that the state did not meet its burden to provide sufficient evidence of his repeater status under § 973.12 at sentencing and that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to dismiss the persistent repeater enhancer and failing to object to the court taking judicial notice at sentencing.

The state originally charged Banks with two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of felony bail jumping. Over a year later, the state dismissed the complaint so that it could refile adding persistent repeater enhancers to the sexual assault charges. The refiled complaint alleged that Banks was a persistent repeater because he had been convicted of repeated sexual assault of the same child in 2003. (¶¶3-4).

A jury found Banks guilty of one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child, resulting in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of extended supervision pursuant to § 939.62(2m)(c). (¶4). At sentencing, the state asked the circuit court to take judicial notice of Banks’s prior conviction and the court accessed that case in the electronic record. Trial counsel did not object. Applying the persistent repeater enhancer, the court sentenced Banks to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on ES. (¶5).

Banks filed a postconviction motion for resentencing in which he argued that: the circuit court erred in allowing the State to include the persistent repeater enhancer in the refiled criminal complaint; the State at sentencing provided insufficient evidence of Banks’s prior conviction; and trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not moving to dismiss on the first issue and not objecting on the second issue. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. (¶6). Banks renews his arguments on appeal.

Banks frames his argument related to the circuit court taking judicial notice of the prior conviction as a sufficiency challenge. He contends that the state failed to prove that he was a persistent repeater because it did not provide the court with sufficient evidence for the court to take judicial notice. (¶9). The state responds that it proved Banks’s prior conviction by means of judicial notice when it provided the prior case’s county and case number, and the court used that information to observe the uncertified electronic copy of the judgment of conviction in the electronic record maintained by the Dane County Clerk of Court, at sentencing.

COA concludes that the electronic copy of the judgment of conviction observed by the court satisfied § 973.12(1) because it contained the date and the crime of the prior conviction, and that the state provided the court with the necessary information under § 902.01(4) for the court to take judicial notice of the prior conviction. (¶11). Thus, the state provided sufficient evidence to prove Banks’s repeater status under § 939.62(2m)(b)2. COA goes on to interpret the persistent repeater statute, provides more analysis, and comes to essentially the same conclusion, but clarifies that the circuit court may take judicial notice for purposes of the statute. (¶¶12-45).

The court then considers Banks’s ineffective assistance of counsel arguments. As to counsel’s failure to object to the refiled complaint, COA concludes that Banks could not prove deficient performance because a motion to dismiss would have been meritless. This is because WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1) and related case law do not “preclude the state, as a matter of law, from seeking a dismissal without prejudice in order to file a new complaint which adds a repeater allegation.” State v. Larsen, 177 Wis. 2d 835, 503 N.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1993). COA applies Larsen to the facts here, the purposes behind § 973.12(1) were served, and the refiled complaint did not “sandbag” Banks, when the circuit court dismissed the initial criminal complaint without the enhancer and the state refiled the complaint with the enhancer. (¶53). Thus Banks’s postconviction motion fails to show that the circuit court was required to dismiss the persistent repeater enhancer as a matter of law.

Regarding Banks’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the circuit court taking judicial notice of his prior conviction at sentencing, COA relies on its earlier conclusion that the court did not err when it took judicial notice of an electronic copy of the judgment of conviction, and therefore could have overruled an objection. (¶56). Further, COA rejects Banks’s argument that the conviction cannot be verified on appeal because the prior judgment was not included in the record because he does not argue that the contents of the documents the circuit court relied on were inaccurate. (¶57). As a result, COA concludes that Banks is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and affirms the circuit court’s order dismissing his postconviction motion.

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