Seventh Circuit cases for September and October
The last two months were much slower than usual, but still brought us a handful of potentially relevant cases:
United States of America v. Matthew J. Frazier, No. 24-3286: This case demonstrates the high bar for litigating competency retroactively on appeal. Here, Frazier has a significant mental health history. In 2023, in connection with this case, he was evaluated and found competent. One year later, he requested to waive his jury trial. During that hearing, he described ongoing hallucinations. On appeal, Frazier argues the court had a duty to sua sponte order a new competency evaluation. While the case contains some good cites and language about the duty to inquire into a defendant’s competency, ultimately the standard of review is fatal. Applying a deferential standard of review, the Court is satisfied that the district court did not err. Defense counsel specifically disclaimed any concerns about Frazier’s competency at the hearing, Frazier told the court his mental health was the same as when he was previously found competent, and the record otherwise shows an adequate inquiry by the circuit court.
United States of America v. Robert L. Pennington, Jr., No. 23-3315: Pennington was seized twice while driving through Illinois. During the first stop, for driving eight miles over the speed limit, the officer suspected Pennington was “up to something.” Thus, he continued to question Pennington after he gave Pennington a warning and returned his license and insurance. When the officer was unable to contrive additional justification to continue seizing Pennington, he let Pennington leave. At that point, the officer contacted another officer further down the road to alert him about his suspicions regarding Pennington. Roughly an hour later, that officer seized Pennington for another minor traffic infraction. Although the first officer had already run Pennington’s information during the first stop, the second officer repeated that process, a procedure that was delayed due to “computer issues.” When another officer arrived, he handed off the traffic stop duties to that officer and conducted a dog sniff of Pennington’s car. The dog alerted. On appeal, the Court quickly finds that the first stop violated Rodriguez. However, despite the coordination between the two officers, it goes on to conclude that the second stop, justified by another traffic infraction, was sufficiently attenuated from the first. Finally, the Court rejects Pennington’s argument that the second stop was impermissibly (and pretextually) extended by the officer’s redundant record check. It holds that the second officer was “entitled” to conduct an independent check. Any other delays–like the slight delay caused by the handoff to another officer–are insufficient to trigger a Rodriguez problem. The concise but powerful dissent would find that the second stop, coordinated with the first, was unreasonably delayed by the redundant record check and not adequately attenuated from the first.
United States of America v. Gary L. Howard, No. 25-2164: This case has an unusual fact pattern. Howard was a CI and drug dealer who had a “symbiotic” relationship with a crooked cop, Sabaini, who was eventually convicted of federal corruption charges. In 2018, Howard was arrested in a DEA operation. Sabaini appears to have encouraged Howard to “work off” the arrest by cooperating with the DEA. Howard then consented to a search of his home and cell phone before ultimately breaking off the relationship. That 2018 conduct is the basis for this criminal prosecution. The district court suppressed Howard’s post-arrest statements “as coerced by a false promise of leniency and therefore involuntary and inadmissible.” However, it upheld the search of his residence and home, finding that inevitable discovery did not mandate suppression. On appeal, the Seventh agrees there was probable cause and the testimony from the motion hearing otherwise establishes the inevitability of a search warrant in this case. It also disagrees that the prosecutor acted in a vindictive fashion for adding new charges after Howard’s partial suppression victory as timing alone does not establish vindictiveness.
United States of America v. Kentrevion Watkins et al, No. 20-2048: This is something of a messy Batson case. Following the strikes of two minorities (one of whom was apparently racially ambiguous, or at least the district court said so), the defendants raised a Batson challenge. The district court found that the defendants had not met Step 1. However, after voir dire the judge apparently had second thoughts, and “invited the government to supplement the record with race-neutral reasons for striking both jurors.” The government refused to provide reasons for one of the jurors, #58, given the court’s ruling that Step 1 had not been satisfied. However, it gave a number of explanations for the other, #26. The district court then stated, “I will find those are race-neutral reasons.” On appeal, the Seventh found fault with the district court’s ruling on Step 1 and concluded the ruling on Step 3 was insufficient. It remanded. There was a fight over what should happen on remand. The court then ruled that the defendants satisfied Step 1 for #26 but not for #58. The government provided reasons for both strikes, which the court found credible. On appeal, the Seventh first concludes that the district court once again erred on Step 1, which requires only an “inference” supporting a claim of discrimination. However, that issue is moot. As to Step 2, the Court rejects an argument that the Government was prohibited from supplying additional justification for its strikes on remand. The Court holds that the district court properly concluded that the Government met its burden of production on Step 2. As to Step 3, it defers to the district court’s credibility finding, which includes the district court’s acceptance of the Government’s excuse for not offering a justification for striking #58–a reluctance to reveal “trial strategy.” While this is a disheartening decision, the dissent contains some excellent language and citations for those litigating Batson. The dissent would not permit the proffering of new reasons for striking on remand, analyzes the proper test under Step 1, criticizes the way the racial ambiguity of a stricken juror was handled, and otherwise rejects the district court’s credibility finding when no hearing occurred.
Estate of Ceaser Stinson v. Joel Streicher, No. 22-3043: This case should jog the memory of Milwaukee practitioners. Streicher, a Sheriff’s Deputy, struck and killed Stinson while looking at his cellphone. He pleaded to homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle and (a fact left out of this opinion) received a favorable sentence from a DA’s office otherwise committed to getting tough on fatal accidents, a grand total of six months jail. Stinson’s family tries to recover under § 1983. To prevail, they would have to prove that Streicher’s conduct “was so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” That standard effectively requires deliberate indifference. The Court finds the standard unsatisfied here and reverses the district court’s summary judgment order.
Eric D. Holmes v. Ron Neal, No. 23-2890: We tried and failed to condense this opinion, a capital habeas case, in capsule format. While the substance is irrelevant to Wisconsin readers, we are nevertheless flagging it for our habeas practitioners as it contains an in-depth discussion of the “second or subsequent” rule for habeas petitions under federal law.
United States of America v. Dan R. Waeckerle Jr., No. 24-1941: Waeckerle was arrested for having contact with a fifteen-year-old girl that included inappropriate messages. Inappropriate pictures and videos exchanged were deleted and not available for prosecution. The Court first concludes this is one of the “rare” cases where there was still sufficient circumstantial evidence, given the texts, that he had “solicited” and “transferred” obscene material. It also finds that the district court properly excluded testimony about messages the child had exchanged with other men, finding they do not fit within a rape shield exception. Finally, it finds nothing improper about the court’s decision to excuse a jury and substitute an alternate midway through the trial due to a funeral.