On Point blog, page 1 of 119
COA issues first impression decision on constitutionality of warrant to search contents of smartphone, holds “the warrant must specify the particular items of evidence to be searched for and seized from the [smart]phone,” and its authorization must be “limited to the time period and information or other data for which probable cause has been properly established… in the warrant’s supporting affidavit”
State v. Emil L. Melssen, 2024AP1942-CR, 11/20/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Emil Melssen appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial, in which he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and related charges. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the execution of two search warrants. COA rejects Melssen’s sufficiency argument, but concludes that the warrant to search his smartphone violated the Fourth Amendment because it was overbroad and not carefully tailored to its justifications. The court remands for a determination on the remedy.
COA finds sufficient evidence to affirm trial conviction for violating domestic abuse injunction by sending Facebook message.
State v. Clinton J. Adams, 2025AP1179, 11/26/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA affirms jury’s conviction for knowingly violating a domestic abuse injunction over sufficiency challenge.
SCOTUS: Mississippi statute mandating screening child witness from defendant violates right to confrontation.
Jeffrey Clyde Pitts v. Mississippi, USSC No. 24-1159, 11/24/2025; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS reverses conviction for child abuse because Mississippi law that requires screening at trial for child witnesses conflicted with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to face-to-face confrontation.
Defense Win: In TPR rife with error, COA holds that court erroneously granted default judgment and clarifies ICWA voluntary termination procedure
Sheboygan County DH&HS v. Z.N., 2025AP1817, 11/7/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
In an unpublished but citable case, COA clarifies there is no requirement that respondent appear in person for a voluntary termination of parental rights in an ICWA case and reverses the circuit court’s default finding.
COA authorizes circuit courts to consider prejudice when determining whether to join cases for trial
State v. Max Bell, 2024AP1923-CR, 2024AP1924-CR, & 2024AP1925-CR, 11/13/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Whether to join cases for trial is a separate inquiry from whether to sever cases that have been joined. While the severance subsection of the joinder statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3), directs the circuit court to sever charges if a party is prejudiced by joinder, the circuit court is not required by statute to consider prejudice when determining whether charges should be joined. See Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1),(4). Nevertheless, the COA held in a decision recommended for publication that a circuit court is permitted to consider prejudice when making its initial joinder decision. The COA affirmed joinder of Max Bell’s charges for trial and his subsequent convictions in each case.
COA affirms TPR order, rejects arguments premised on “substantial likelihood” question for continuing CHIPS as undeveloped and forfeited
Kenosha County v. V.L.W., 2025AP1914, 11/12/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects “Victor’s” arguments on appeal, which are all based on the continuing CHIPS “substantial likelihood” provision applying in his case. COA concludes that Victor did not prove this provision, which requires that the has been placed outside the home for less than 15 of the most recent 22 months, should apply.
COA affirms denial of suppression motion in OWI 3rd case based on concession
State v. Richard T. Weske, 2025AP154-CR, 11/5/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Weske appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the investigatory traffic stop constituted an unreasonable seizure because the officer was outside his jurisdiction and was therefore without authority to conduct the stop. COA affirms, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop for a suspected OWI, and Weske conceded that the officer had the authority to do so outside his jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 349.03(4).
Defense Win: COA clarifies defense of others doctrine and holds erroneous instructions merit new trial
State v. Tommy Jay Cross, 2023AP2013-CR, 11/4/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
In an opinion that might remind some readers of their first year of law school, COA outlines the basic principles of Wisconsin’s self-defense doctrine and holds that the jury was given inaccurate instructions on the subject as it pertains to defense of others.
COA affirms probable cause finding at refusal hearing
State v. Jason D. Hull, 2025AP483, 10/23/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed the circuit court’s judgment that the Dodge County Sheriff’s Department had probable cause to believe that Jason Hull operated a vehicle while intoxicated and his refusal to submit to chemical testing was therefore improper.
In opinion recommended for publication, COA holds defendant is not judicially estopped from raising newly discovered evidence claim due to guilty plea and clarifies NDE test for plea withdrawal
State v. Scott R. Shallcross, 2023AP362, 10/7/25, District I (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This appear arises from Shallcross’s Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction motion, in which he sought to withdraw his guilty pleas based on newly discovered evidence. Shallcross, pro se, argues on appeal that the state committed a Brady violation, and the circuit court should have analyzed his motion as a Brady claim. The state argues that Shallcross is judicially estopped from arguing that he was not responsibible because he admitted as much by pleading guilty, and that the new evidence is not exculpatory under Brady. COA holds that Shallcross is not judicially estopped from raising his plea withdrawal claim based on newly discovered evidence, but agrees with the state that the claim fails under Brady and the newly discovered evidence test.