On Point blog, page 6 of 17
Defense win in SCOTUS casts doubt on SCOW decision permitting counsel to concede client’s guilt
McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16 – 8255, 2018 WL 218-617, 5/14/18, reversing and remanding State v. McCoy, 2018 So.3d 535 (La. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).
In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, SCOTUS holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his lawyer refrain from admitting that he is guilty of a charged crime when he objects to that admission. It further holds that if a lawyer concedes guilt in this situation, Strickland and the harmless error rule do not apply. The defendant automatically gets a new trial.
Are constitutional errors really ever harmless?
This new law review article by Daniel Epps examine the subject in depth. Consider this excerpt from the abstract:
Judges and commentators sharply disagree about which (and even whether) constitutional errors can be harmless, how to conduct harmless-error when it analysis applies, and, most fundamentally, what harmless constitutional error even is-what source of law generates it and enables the Supreme Court to require its use by state courts. This Article offers a new theory of harmless constitutional error,
SCOW to decide whether directing a verdict for the State at the close of its case is structural error
State v. C.L.K., 2017AP1414, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 3/14/18; case activity
Issues:
1. Where, during the grounds phase of a TPR trial, the circuit court errs by directing a verdict in favor of the State without giving the respondent an opportunity to present evidence, has the court committed structural error, or is the error subject to a harmless error analysis?
2. If the error in this case is not structural, then was it harmless?
SCOW will decide if excluding OWI homicide defendant’s evidence he wasn’t the driver was harmless
State v. Kyle Lee Monahan, 2014AP2187, petition for review of an unpublished COA decision granted 11/13/17; case activity (including briefs)
The parties and the state agree that the circuit court erred in excluding Kyle Monahan’s proffered GPS evidence from his trial; the only dispute in this appeal is whether that error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Et tu, Bruton? SCOW says Confrontation Clause doesn’t bar admission of co-defendant’s inculpatory statements to fellow inmate
State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 6/29/17, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2014AP1623-CR; case activity (including briefs)
Forget the old saws that “appellate courts decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds,” “appellate courts should not reach constitutional issues when another issue is dispositive,” and “the supreme court should not decide issues forfeited in the court of appeals.” They don’t constrain SCOW here. Indeed, the majority opinion rushes past the plain language of §971.12(3) in order to decide a major Confrontation Clause issue and to reverse a big defense win in the court of appeals.
SCOTUS delves into structural error
Weaver v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 16-240, 2017 WL 2674153 (June 22, 2017); affirming Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495 (Mass. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Members of the public–specifically, Kentel Weaver’s family–were excluded from the overcrowded courtroom during jury selection for his trial. Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to public trial have been called structural errors not susceptible to harmless error analysis. But Weaver’s lawyer didn’t object, so this is an ineffective assistance claim, which of course requires him to show prejudice. But how do you show that you were prejudiced by a structural error–after all, the term refers to an error whose “effect … cannot be ascertained”? United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006).
Evidence that victim was shot exactly 1 year after defendant’s brother was shot and killed deemed admissible
State v. Tyshun DeMichael Young, 2016AP657-CR, 6/20/17, District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Young of attempted 1st-degree intentional homicide and 1st degree recklessly-endangering safety with use of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, he argued that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to hear evidence that his younger brother was killed exactly one year prior to the date he allegedly shot the victims in this case.
Court of appeals frowns strongly at state, declares error harmless
State v. Kyle Lee Monahan, 2014AP2187, 4/27/17, District 4 (not recommended for publication) review granted 11/13/17; Affirmed 6/29/18; case activity (including briefs)
Kyle Monahan was convicted of OWI homicide after a jury trial. The trial court excluded evidence offered to show that Monahan was not, in fact, driving the vehicle when it crashed. On appeal, the state agrees with Monahan that the evidence should have come in, but argues that its exclusion was harmless. The court of appeals agrees with the state.
Court of appeals rejects evidentiary challenges
State v. John A. Augoki, 2016AP231-CR, 4/25/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Augoki raises two claims on appeal of his jury-trial conviction of three sexual assaults: that the jury heard other-acts evidence it should hot have heard (raised here as plain error) and that the court unconstitutionally limited his cross-examination of a state expert. The court of appeals rejects both in a fact-intensive opinion.
Court of appeals again blurs harmless error test
State v. Julius Alfonso Coleman, 2013AP2100-CR, 3/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Julius Coleman was set up by a confidential informant to participate in an armed robbery of a nonexistent drug dealer named “Poncho.” He challenges the admission of various statements at trial on the ground that they were taken in violation of Miranda. The court of appeals concludes that any error in their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but along the way (and not for the first time) seems to confuse the test for harmless error with that for sufficiency of the evidence.