On Point: 23. Structural error

Kenosha County v. A.C.S., 2022AP1821-1825, 2/15/23, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Here’s a fact pattern one hopes doesn’t come up too often. The county sought the termination of “Anna’s” parental rights to five children. It then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she’d been convicted of a serious felony related to the death of another child. A hearing was set, but Anna’s counsel informed the court she’d be in trial in a homicide case. Expecting an adjournment–which both trial counsel and the court of appeals note is “common practice” in such a situation–the attorney told Anna the hearing would be put off. Counsel’s homicide trial then unexpectedly ended early, though she still had work to do to wrap it up. The TPR court apparently heard through the grapevine that the homicide trial was over. Without any successful contact–or much apparent effort to contact–Anna or her lawyer, the court held the scheduled hearing ex parte and, at the county’s request, granted summary judgment. Later, over Anna and her counsel’s protestations, the court terminated her rights.

Barron County v. K.L., 2021AP133, District 3, 8/9/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, held that “going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” Deciding an issue addressed in the dissenting opinion in Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, the court of appeals holds the failure to comply with D.J.W.‘s findings requirement can be a harmless error and was harmless in this case.

State v. Robert Daris Spencer, 2018AP942-CR, petition for review, and petition for cross review, of an unpublished court of appeals decision, both granted 8/13/21; case activity (including briefs)

Issues presented (composed by On Point from the PFR and cross PFR)

1.  Was the circuit court’s ex parte voir dire and removal of a juror during trial a structural error requiring automatic reversal, or is it subject to harmless error analysis?
2. Did the circuit court improperly consider the race of the defendant and the witnesses in deciding to dismiss juror?
3. Is a defendant entitled to a postconviction hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the record conclusively shows the claim should be denied?

State v. Kenyon D. Grant, 2020AP785, 3/9/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) held that trial counsel cannot concede guilt over his client’s express objection. This would deny the client his 6th Amendment right to determine the objective of his defense and require an automatic new trial. Grant raised a McCoy claim in this case. It failed because trial counsel testified that Grant did not oppose his concession strategy and objected only after hearing the State’s evidence against him.

State v. Decarlos K. Chambers, 2019AP411-CR, 2021 WI 13, 2/23/21, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion,  case activity (including briefs)

SCOTUS recently held that when a client expressly asserts that he wants to maintain his innocence, defense counsel cannot override that objective and concede guilt. If counsel does, a structural error occurs, and the client automatically gets a new trial. McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). This appeal had the potential to clarify whether McCoy altered Wisconsin law on this subject.  See our post on McCoy. Alas, this decision does not address Wisconsin law. Instead, SCOW unanimously affirms that defense counsel did not concede her client’s guilt.

State v. Decarlos K. Chambers, 2019AP411-CR, petition for review of per curiam opinion granted 9/16/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issue presented (derived from Cambers’ petition for review):

The State charged Chambers with 1st degree reckless homicide. He maintained that he had not committed the crimes and that was absolutely innocent. He refused all plea offers. Nevertheless, during closing arguments his lawyer told the jury they should consider convicting him of 2nd degree recklessly homicide, and they did.  The issues is whether trial counsel violated Chambers’ 6th Amendment right to determine his own defense under  McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S Ct. 1500 (2018).

State v. Duanne D. Townsend, 2019AP787, 6/9/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Good news: the court of appeals reversed a circuit court decision denying Townsend’s §974.06 motion without a hearing. Townsend now gets a one on his claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction and trial counsel. Bad news: the court of appeals botched the issue of whether Townsend was denied his 6th Amendment right to determine his own defense under McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S Ct. 1500 (2018). As noted in our post on McCoy, SCOW needs to square that decision with Wisconsin case law.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

State v. C.L.K., 2019 WI 14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; 2/19/19; case activity (including briefs)

The State of Wisconsin petitioned the Milwaukee County Circuit Court to terminate C.L.K.’s parental rights, following which the matter went to trial in due course. After the State rested, the circuit court immediately  decided that Mr. K. was an unfit parent. That is, the circuit court decided the matter before giving Mr. K. an opportunity to present his case. The State concedes this was error, but says it is susceptible to a “harmless-error” review. It is not. We hold that denying a defendant the opportunity to present his case-in-chief is a structural error, the consequence of which is an automatic new trial. Opinion, ¶1.

McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16 – 8255, 2018 WL 218-617, 5/14/18, reversing and remanding State v. McCoy, 2018 So.3d 535 (La. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).

In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, SCOTUS holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his lawyer refrain from admitting that he is guilty of a charged crime when he objects to that admission. It further holds that if a lawyer concedes guilt in this situation, Strickland and the harmless error rule do not apply. The defendant automatically gets a new trial.