On Point: 1. Appeals

State v. R.J.S., 2024AP2186, 2/7/25, District I (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects R.J.S.’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and applies a well-settled standard of review to uphold the circuit court’s discretionary termination order.

Sheboygan County v. N.A.L., 2024AP1195, 2/5/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 5/21/25 case activity

In yet another appeal asking COA to clarify the procedure for accepting a stipulation to a mental commitment, COA refuses N.A.L.’s invitation to issue a precedential opinion and affirms based largely on a prior unpublished decision.

City of Rhinelander v. Zachary Tyler LaFave-LaCrosse, 2020AP1120 & 1121, 1/7/25, District III (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

LaCrosse appeals pro se from the circuit court judgments, entered after a bench trial, convicting him of first-offense operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) and refusing to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. COA rejects all his arguments and affirms.

State v. Cordero D. Coleman, 2023AP2414-CR, 12/27/24, District IV (recommended for publication), case activity

COA holds that a 32-month delay in trying Coleman did not violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial where the COVID-19 pandemic was the primary cause of the delay. In doing so, COA identifies a new category of reasons for state-attributed delay, “which encompasses those delays that are caused by a reasonable government response to a legitimate public emergency” and holds such delays should not be weighed against the state. (¶56).

In a set of non-criminal opinions, SCOW issues new guidance on the commonly-invoked rule that COA is not at liberty to disagree with its own precedents and also takes another run at clarifying when a final order is truly “final” for the purposes of appeal.

State v. T.D.V., 2024AP2057-FT, 1/22/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity

The State fails to adequately respond to T.D.V.’s argument that his substitution request was improperly denied, so COA remands the matter for a new trial.

State v. Andreas W. Rauch Sharak, 2024AP469-CR, 1/16/25, District 4; case activity (including briefs)

Rauch Sharak’s appeal concerns whether Fourth Amendment safeguards are implicated when an electronic service provider (ESP) scans for and reviews digital files in an individual’s account that are flagged as child pornography; and when law enforcement subsequently opens and views any flagged files that the ESP sent to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).

Monroe County v. H.K.B., 2024AP1305, District 4, 1/16/25 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

On appeal from the two most recent Watts review hearings, the COA concludes that there was insufficient evidence for the protective placement order because the County failed to prove that H.K.B. was “so totally incapable of providing for . . . her own care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to . . . herself or others,” as required by § 55.08(1)(c).under Wis. Stat. § 55.08(1)(c).

Wood County v. P.J.L., 2024AP2098-FT, 1/9/25, District IV (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a chapter 55 appeal arising from a somewhat unusual posture–a continued protective placement order following a jury trial–COA’s invocation of an exceedingly deferential standard of review results in affirmance.

State v. D.Y., 2024AP710, 12/26/24, District I (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Daniel” appeals from the circuit court’s order adjudicating him as a juvenile delinquent, on the basis of a second-degree sexual assault of a child offense. (¶1). He contends that the state failed to prove the intent element, specifically, sexual gratification or arousal from the contact. (¶10). The COA concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s decision and affirms.