On Point: K. Standards of Review

State v. Richard A. Tourtillot, 2024AP1831, 7/7/26, District III (not recommended for publication); case activity

The COA determined the defendant’s consent to a blood draw was voluntary under a since-repealed portion of the Implied Consent Law.

State v. Nicholas B. Selerski., , 2024AP1846-CR, 6/25/26, District IV (certification opinion); case activity

In a case that might make many appellate attorneys justifiably nervous, COA asks whether we’ve all been getting sentencing law wrong for decades.

Green County v. K.M.S., 2025AP199, 6/18/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying an exceptionally deferential review to K.M.S.’s ineffectiveness claims, COA affirms in the face of a somewhat confusing appellate record.

County of Milwaukee v. Kent Austin Williams, 2025AP2110, 6/16/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity

Kent Austin Williams, pro se, challenges the circuit court’s judgment finding him guilty of speeding on the basis that Milwaukee County did not present sufficient evidence to support the violation. COA disagrees and affirms.

Clark v. Mississippi, USSC No. 25-6846, 6/8/2026, denying petition for certiorari; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)

SCOTUS denied Tony Terrell Clark’s petition for a writ of certiorari from the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision affirming his conviction at a capital trial.  Clark argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel during jury selection because his trial lawyer did not adequately raise a Batson challenge when the State struck black jurors at a rate five times more than white jurors.  Justice Sotomayor joined the Court’s decision to deny certiorari because Clark did not argue his counsel’s performance was deficient, but explained in an accompanying statement why the Court needs to address the conflict among state and federal courts regarding the standard to evaluate prejudice for a Batson claim.

State v. Kimberly D. Zapata, 2025AP425-CR, 5/12/26, District I (recommended for publication); case activity

The Deputy Director of the City of Milwaukee Election Commission was convicted at trial of election fraud and misconduct in public office after she had fictitious military absentee ballots sent to a state legislator to publicize the potential for election fraud with such ballots.  In a decision recommended for publication, the COA affirmed her convictions because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find she “obtained” the ballots for purposes of election fraud and acted in her public capacity.

County of Trempealeau v. Layne Perry Stenberg, 2024AP281, 4/21/26, District III (recommended for publication); case activity

Stenberg argues that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2), Wisconsin’s implied consent law, is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him. Specifically, he argues that the implied consent law violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by requiring him to “forfeit” his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches for the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, and that it violates the least intrusive means test under the Fourth Amendment. COA rejects Stenberg’s arguments.

State v. Alexander C. Beaver, 2025AP1768-CR, 4/1/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity

The COA affirmed the circuit court’s award of restitution to a disorderly conduct victim where the defendant fled the scene in a vehicle jointly owned by the victim and the defendant and did not return the vehicle.

State v. Conor Alexander Noble, 2025AP811-CR, 3/11/26, District II (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

COA rejects Noble’s facial unconstitutionality challenge to Wisconsin’s Implied Consent Law (ICL) and affirms the circuit court’s denial of Noble’s motion to suppress the blood draw results for lack of voluntary consent.

Jefferson County DHS v. G.J.J., 2025AP2491, 3/5/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity

While G.J.J. gets closer than most–and his arguments even give COA “pause”–ultimately, the deferential standard of review applicable to dispositional decisions results in affirmance.