On Point: K. Standards of Review

State v. Juan J. Castillo, 2020AP983, 6/29/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Castillo was tried for the alleged sexual assault of his five-year-old cousin when he was sixteen. He wished to call an expert to testify about the factors that can affect the reliability of a child’s allegations of assault; the circuit court disallowed this testimony. The court of appeals upholds the circuit court’s ruling on that matter, concluding that the testimony didn’t “fit” the facts of this case. But the court does order a new trial, holding the circuit court should have granted the mistrial Castillo requested after the now-8-year-old alleged victim “blurted out” on the stand that Castillo had assaulted three other girls, and after his sister gave testimony suggesting he was incarcerated at the time of trial.

State v. M.D.M., 2021 WI App 42; case activity

In 2014, the State filed petitions charging M.D.M., a juvenile, with multiple counts of delinquency. He was found incompetent but likely to regain, so the court suspended these cases. In 2016, the State filed a new petition charging M.D.M. with 1 count of delinquency. This time M.D.M. was found competent to proceed, so the State wanted to resume prosecution of his 2014 case as well. This published opinion establishes the procedure for recalling a case after a juvenile regains competency.

State v. Alijouwon T. Watkins, 2019AP1996-CR, 5/27/21, District 4 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Watkins with several crimes stemming from a domestic violence call: these included escape and battery to one of the police officers who arrested him. While Watkins was in jail, the state charged him with three more crimes related to his alleged attempts to secure perjured testimony about the earlier incident and, the state said, have the arresting officer/alleged victim killed.

State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2021 WI 27, 3/18/21, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity (including some briefs)

Julie Jensen died by poisoning in 1998. The state eventually charged her husband, Mark, with having killed her; the defense was that she had died by suicide. Before her death Julie had made oral and written statements to the effect that Mark would be responsible if something happened to her. She wasn’t available to testify at the trial, of course, and Mark moved to exclude these statements on Confrontation grounds. Our supreme court now holds that, when it held these statements testimonial in a prior appeal (in 2007), it established the law of the case; it further concludes that SCOTUS has not altered the law so much since then that the law-of-the-case doctrine should give way. So, it remands for a new trial, without the statements.

State v. Donald P. Coughlin, 2019AP1876-CR, District 4, 3/4/21 (not recommended for publication), state’s petition for review granted 9/14/21; case activity (including briefs)

In 2010 Coughlin was charged with over 20 counts of having sexual contact with three different children during various periods between 1989 and 1994. The court of appeals holds the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the counts involving  two of the children.

State v. Greg Douglas Griswold, 2020AP1598, District 4, 3/4/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Griswold was convicted of violating § 26.12(5)(b) by starting a fire in an “extensive forest protection area” without a permit. The statute excepts fires started for warmth, and Griswold claimed that’s what he was doing. When evidence supports more than one reasonable inference, the reviewing court accepts the inference drawn by the trier of fact, see, e.g., State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 504, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), and under that standard the trial court reasonably rejected Griswold’s defense.

State v. Timothy D. Wright, 2020AP1578, 2/25/2021, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wright worked at Christmas Mountain. Over the course of a couple of months he allegedly directed several racist and threatening rants at colleagues, including threats to kill some of them. A supervisor eventually called the police, and Wright was fired and charged with four counts of disorderly conduct. He eventually pleaded to two with the other two read in. The circuit court ordered Wright to pay $14,755 in restitution to the corporation that owns Christmas Mountain at $100 per month. Wright argues this was improper for three reasons: because the corporation was not statutorily a “victim” of his conduct; because the claimed damages–the cost to hire armed guards after he was fired–were not “special damages … which could be recovered in a civil action”; and because the circuit court failed to consider his inability to pay.

State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.

State v. Raymond R. Barton, 2019AP1990, 9/24/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Barton was convicted at trial of three counts involving battery of his adult stepson. He argues the trial court should have granted the mistrial he asked for when his daughter testified she was afraid that something had happened because “things had happened before.” He also asserts the court should have instructed the jury on self-defense. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.

State v. Nathaniel R. Lecker, 2020 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)

The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law. This is an incontrovertible maxim of appellate review. “Question of law” sounds so august and erudite and specialized, doesn’t it? A question of law is a question into which an astute lawyer–or judge–would have special insight; he or she could be trusted to come to the right–or at least a particularly sound–answer to such a question. But sometimes statutes are written in very ordinary terms with no particular resonance, and no special definition, in the legal world. And sometimes these ordinary terms are also rather elastic–or relative. In those instances, can the answer to a “question of law” be something other than a standardless, “know it when I see it” exercise of arbitrary will?