On Point blog, page 18 of 51
Defense win: Evidence about sexual activity with children too general to support many of the convictions
State v. Donald P. Coughlin, 2019AP1876-CR, District 4, 3/4/21 (not recommended for publication), state’s petition for review granted 9/14/21; case activity (including briefs)
In 2010 Coughlin was charged with over 20 counts of having sexual contact with three different children during various periods between 1989 and 1994. The court of appeals holds the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the counts involving two of the children.
Evidence supported inference defendant didn’t start fire to keep himself warm
State v. Greg Douglas Griswold, 2020AP1598, District 4, 3/4/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Griswold was convicted of violating § 26.12(5)(b) by starting a fire in an “extensive forest protection area” without a permit. The statute excepts fires started for warmth, and Griswold claimed that’s what he was doing. When evidence supports more than one reasonable inference, the reviewing court accepts the inference drawn by the trier of fact, see, e.g., State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 504, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), and under that standard the trial court reasonably rejected Griswold’s defense.
COA upholds restitution to corporation for threats to employees
State v. Timothy D. Wright, 2020AP1578, 2/25/2021, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wright worked at Christmas Mountain. Over the course of a couple of months he allegedly directed several racist and threatening rants at colleagues, including threats to kill some of them. A supervisor eventually called the police, and Wright was fired and charged with four counts of disorderly conduct. He eventually pleaded to two with the other two read in. The circuit court ordered Wright to pay $14,755 in restitution to the corporation that owns Christmas Mountain at $100 per month. Wright argues this was improper for three reasons: because the corporation was not statutorily a “victim” of his conduct; because the claimed damages–the cost to hire armed guards after he was fired–were not “special damages … which could be recovered in a civil action”; and because the circuit court failed to consider his inability to pay.
SCOW: Expert opinion on risk not needed in ch. 980 proceeding
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.
COA finds no error in denying mistrial or in refusing self-defense instruction
State v. Raymond R. Barton, 2019AP1990, 9/24/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Barton was convicted at trial of three counts involving battery of his adult stepson. He argues the trial court should have granted the mistrial he asked for when his daughter testified she was afraid that something had happened because “things had happened before.” He also asserts the court should have instructed the jury on self-defense. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.
COA holds overdose aider immunity didn’t apply the day after 911 call
State v. Nathaniel R. Lecker, 2020 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)
The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law. This is an incontrovertible maxim of appellate review. “Question of law” sounds so august and erudite and specialized, doesn’t it? A question of law is a question into which an astute lawyer–or judge–would have special insight; he or she could be trusted to come to the right–or at least a particularly sound–answer to such a question. But sometimes statutes are written in very ordinary terms with no particular resonance, and no special definition, in the legal world. And sometimes these ordinary terms are also rather elastic–or relative. In those instances, can the answer to a “question of law” be something other than a standardless, “know it when I see it” exercise of arbitrary will?
COA upholds trial court’s rulings in OWI-first
County of Milwaukee v. Christann Spannraft, 2018AP1553 & 1554, 6/23/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)
This is a pro se appeal of an OWI-1st conviction. Spannraft raises three claims, all of which are rejected.
SCOW continues Jensen saga, grants state’s rather thin petition
State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2018AP1952, petition for review of a summary court of appeals order granted 6/16/20; affirmed 3/18/21; case activity
Usually we do to the issues presented first. Here, they’re pretty insubstantial, so let’s just say what’s going on: the supreme court has intervened to (potentially) save a manifestly unconstitutional (and you don’t have to take our word for it) homicide conviction and life sentence in a notorious case.
Defense win! COA affirms suppression of confession given after polygraph exam
State v. Adam W. Vice, 2020 WI App 34, petition for review granted 8/30/20, reversed, 2021 WI 63; case activity (including briefs)
This is a “recommended for publication”, split court of appeals opinion where the State lost in a child sexual assault case. In other words the State will surely petition for review, and SCOW will take it. Applying State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332, the majority held that the defendant’s polygraph test and the confession were two discrete events, but based on the facts of this case, the confession was involuntary. The dissent by Judge Hruz would hold the confession voluntary.
COA affirms denial of reconsideration, rejects constitutional challenge to refusal statute
State v. Aman D. Singh, 2018AP2412-CR, 4/16/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Singh appealed an OWI second, which the court of appeals summarily reversed and remanded with an order for the circuit court to provide the relief due under §971.13–voiding any penalty in excess of the statutory maximum. On remand, the circuit court did as ordered, Singh moved for reconsideration asking the circuit court to vacate the judgment of conviction, vacate his plea, and dismiss the case. Motion denied. Decision affirmed.