On Point: K. Standards of Review

State v. Jimothy A. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 7/11/14, review of an per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by C.J. Abrahamson; case activity

This is a very nice victory for the defense.  It clarifies the “prejudice” showing required for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  And it assures lower courts that, where trial counsel fails to call an eyewitness whose credibility can be challenged, it is still quite possible to show the prejudice required for a new trial.  After all, witness credibility is for the jury to decide.

City of Antigo v. M.K., 2013AP2627, District 3, 7/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court held there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle M.K. was driving because the court found the officer knew the vehicle’s registration was expired before he made the stop. The court’s finding of fact was not clearly erroneous, even though the officer’s testimony was equivocal as to whether he learned that fact as part of the original dispatch or after he spotted the vehicle and called in the license plate.

State v. David Phillip Foley, 2013AP1722-CR/2013AP1723-CR; district 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity

Under § 943.20(1)(d), theft by fraud requires, among other things, that the defendant made a false representation to the owner of the property that the defendant stole.  This does not require direct communication between the defendant and the victim.  It is sufficient that the defendant made a statement to a third party with the intent or reasonable expectation that it would be communicated to the victim.

State v. Jesse J. Franklin, Jr., 2013AP1447, District 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity

Milwaukee Police Officers Paul Lough and James Campbell testified against Franklin at his trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm by a felon.  Franklin was convicted and lost his appeal.  A few years later he filed a § 974.06 motion arguing that he should be granted a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence–namely evidence that Officers Campbell and Lough had beaten, planted evidence on, and falsely arrested 6 individuals during the same period in which they arrested Franklin.  Franklin argued that this evidence supported his defense that someone else had placed in his van the drugs and guns that the police found there.

State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity

This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense.  Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial.  The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.

Fond du Lac County v. Douglas L. Bethke, 2013AP2297, District 2, 4/30/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it excluded evidence of particular crime lab errors that happened years before Bethke’s blood sample was analyzed.

State v. John Francis Ferguson, 2014 WI App 48; case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Ferguson’s plea withdrawal motion, which was based on recantations by two witnesses who had previously said Ferguson fatally shot a man. The circuit judge applied the proper standard under State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), when it found the recantations were incredible as a matter of law and uncorroborated by other newly-discovered evidence, and its findings are not clearly erroneous.

State v. Daniel K. Rogers, 2012AP186-CR, District 4, 4/17/14; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The defendant, having been charged with sexual assault and released on bond, allegedly choked his victim to make her to lie on his behalf at trial. The circuit court admitted this as § 904.04(2) “other acts” evidence at the sexual assault trial, and the COA affirmed because the evidence showed consciousness of guilt.

State v. Venceremos Crump, 2013AP2163-CR, District 1, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court articulated its reasons for the sentence imposed on Crump as required by State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, in light of the court’s comments in its order denying Crump’s postconviction motion, where it explicitly addressed the three primary sentencing factors and applied those factors to the facts of Crump’s case.

State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity

The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).

Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),